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1 Introduction
In the face of decreasing employment opportunities for low-skilled workers, the pressure on ed-
ucation systems to equip students with the necessary skills to succeed in modern labour markets
is growing (European Commission, 2014). Wössmann (2016) demonstrates that national school
systems differ markedly in how well they live up to this task. This raises the question how the
optimal school system should be organised. While the (positive) effect of some institutional features
of school systems on student achievement is relatively well-established by now (e.g. central exit
exams), others remain fiercely debated. One of the most controversial issues in this regard is the
practice of ability tracking. Tracking means grouping students by ability into vertically ordered
school tracks. Countries differ widely on the degree to which they track students, and the age at
which students begin to be tracked (Betts, 2011). Some countries, like Finland, eschew tracking
altogether, relying only on comprehensive compulsory schooling. Others, like Germany, separate
students into one of three ranked schools types at an age as early as 10. Between these two extremes
lie countries like the US, which stream students into different tracks within schools.
The argument behind grouping students by ability is always one of efficiency.1 Proponents
of tracking posit that lower variance classrooms allow for better tailoring of curricula, instruction
speed and pedagogy to students’ abilities and should, therefore, benefit learning for all students
(Duflo et al., 2010). Critics, in contrast, fear that only high track/ability students benefit from
tracking, whereas students assigned to lower tracks are condemned to lower achievement compared
to a scenario with comprehensive schooling. Indeed, there are many mechanisms that might make
the effects of tracking heterogeneous. First, to the extent that high performing peers are beneficial
to learning (or low performing ones harmful), tracking mechanically exerts an unequal influence
as it deprives lower track students of more able peers (Sacerdote, 2011). Second, there might be
motivational consequences of separating students by ability. Lower track students, knowing they
are deemed to be of lower aptitude, might feel discouraged and reduce their learning efforts. Third,
if (financial) resources differ between tracks, students of certain tracks might be disadvantaged
(Betts, 2011). Additionally, even if ability tracking is theoretically Pareto efficient, practical
1The debate on tracking being a long-standing one, there is a vast social-scientific literature that discusses its pros
and cons. For seminal contributions see e.g. Oakes (1985), Gamoran and Mare (1989) and Slavin (1990).
1
implementation is likely to be error-prone as ability is not directly observable and proxies like
teacher assessments and tests are noisy and can be socio-economically biased (Brunello et al.,
2007; van Ewijk, 2011).
Given these opposing mechanisms, the net effect of tracking on student achievement is theoret-
ically ambiguous and ultimately an empirical question. If proponents are right and homogeneous
classrooms increase the effectiveness of teaching, tracking should raise average achievement by
benefiting students of all ability levels. If the hypothesised negative effects are at work, tracked
school systems should depress student achievement at the bottom. In terms of efficiency, the
net effect of tracking then depends on scope and relative strength of these effects.2 In terms of
equity, tracking might thus translate small performance differentials at young ages into substantial
inequalities in later life. These dynamics should be more pronounced the earlier tracking starts, as
divergences can accumulate, and in between-school tracking systems as compared to within-school
ones, as the vertical differentiation between tracks is stronger (Betts, 2011).
Indeed, achievement differences between students of different tracks are large and well-
documented (e.g. Dustmann, 2004) and countries with more rigid tracking systems tend to exhibit
higher levels of educational inequality (Waldinger, 2007). The problem is that such correlational
findings, whether at the individual or the country level, are likely to suffer from severe endogeneity.
Students are not randomly allocated to school tracks but explicitly selected on ability. Similarly,
countries’ educational systems are affected by historical factors that also directly influence stu-
dent outcomes. In the face of these selection problems no clear consensus on the effect of early
between-school tracking has emerged in the empirical literature. While, in line with theory, effect
estimates for high-ability students seem to vary between positive and null, the evidence on how
tracking affects low-ability students is more mixed.
This paper exploits unique within-country between-state variation in tracking practices in
Germany to isolate the effect of early between-school tracking on the achievement of students in
lower tracks. While in all German states primary school is comprehensive, the grouping of students
in secondary school, which commences in fifth grade when students are about ten years of age,
differs between states: some states have a three-tiered and others a two-tiered secondary school
2It appears that the costs of tracked and untracked school systems are roughly comparable (Hanushek andWössmann,
2006). Following the literature, I therefore loosely refer to differences in mean outcomes as efficiency differences.
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system. In the former, students are tracked between low-, intermediate- and academic-track schools
based on their performance in primary school. In states with the two-tiered regime, low- and
intermediate-track schools were conflated, so that students are only tracked between academic and
non-academic-track schools. Also these combined non-academic-track schools sort students by
ability eventually, but in the first two years of secondary school (i.e. in grades 5 and 6) classes are
formed disregarding previous performance or ability. Academic-track schools, called Gymnasium,
do not differ between states and cater to about 40% of students in either regime. Accordingly,
between-state differences in tracking are relevant only for the non-academic part of the student
body: after comprehensive primary school, non-academic-track students are either directly tracked
into low- and intermediate-track schools or taught comprehensively for another two years.3 Note
that these between-state differences pertain to the ability grouping of students only, as curricula are
fully general in the first years of secondary school everywhere.
My research design exploits this variation in tracking in a difference-in-differences (DD) frame-
work: I estimate how the achievement of one cohort of non-academic-track students develops dif-
ferently over the first two years of secondary school depending on whether students are tracked or
taught comprehensively. This strategy controls for grade-constant heterogeneity between states and
general achievement trends between grades. Because the DD estimate might still be confounded
by state-specific achievement trends, additionally, I compare the between-state differences for non-
academic-track students to those for academic-track students, for whom there is no difference in
tracking between states (who are thus ‘untreated’ no matter the state). This is implemented via
a triple-differences (DDD) estimator. After having thus established the mean effect, I explore the
distributional consequences of tracking. First, I provide non-parametric density estimates of the
impact of tracking on the overall achievement distribution. Second, I explore how the effect of
tracking depends on students’ position in the pre-tracking achievement distribution.
The analysis is based on individual-level panel data for mathematical and reading competence
from the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), which followed one cohort of students
over their school career. The NEPS provides measures of student achievement right before and
after the first two years of secondary school (i.e. right before and after the grade window with
3This refers to all 12 federal states under investigation (out of 16 in total); see section 2.1 and footnote 18.
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clear-cut between-state differences in tracking), as well as detailed information on students’ family
backgrounds and schooling inputs. In addition, I draw on the Institute for Educational Quality
Improvement’s (IQB) National Assessment Studies to corroborate my findings in larger samples
and to assess the persistence of effects through the end of lower secondary schooling.
In sharp contrast with the predictions of tracking advocates, my results suggest that early
between-school tracking decreases student achievement. The average effect of continued compre-
hensive schooling in grades 5 and 6 on seventh-grade test scores is estimated to be 0.17 standard
deviations (SD) in mathematics and 0.24 SD in reading. Even though these effects are not very
precisely estimated they are statistically significant and remarkably stable across specifications that
flexibly control for student and school characteristics, as well as the inclusion of academic-track
students as an additional control group in the DDD model. Robustness checks, such as compar-
ing achievement trends in primary school and excluding outlier states, lend further credence to
the causal interpretation of, at least, the direction of the effect estimates. Finally, the analysis
with the IQB data shows that, while there is some fade-out over time, comprehensively taught
non-academic-track students are still significantly better off towards the end of ninth grade.
The heterogeneity analysis reveals that these results are driven by the lower tail of the initial
achievement distribution: for low-achievers effects are large and persistent, whereas for high-
achievers effect estimates are insignificantly different from zero (yet, strictly non-negative). Con-
sequently, comprehensive schooling has an equalising effect on the distribution of test scores.
Delaying tracking does not trade off efficiency against equity, but seems to enhance both. I provide
a discussion of the channels through which the effect might operate and find empirical support
for the importance of peer effects and socio-emotional mechanisms, like improved school-related
motivation and educational aspirations.
Note that the treatment effect identified in this paper pertains to a population of students that
excludes the group of highest achievers in academic-track schools. Hence, one cannot directly
extrapolate from these results to the effects of fully comprehensive school systems. Still, they
prove wrong the premise that there is a monotonously positive relationship between classroom
homogeneity and student learning. Early between-school tracking appears to impose large costs
on low-achieving students. Accordingly, more dispersed achievement distributions in more tracked
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systems do not appear to be a mere artefact of selection and the oft-voiced equity concerns in this
context seem warranted.
This paper contributes to the literature on the systemic impact of between-school tracking,
which, in the face of the endogeneity issues involved, could only produce tentative evidence so
far. The most credible results stem from two strands of the literature.4 The first exploits temporal
within-country variation in tracking practices induced by de-tracking reforms. The second leverages
the large variation in tracking practices between countries in different ways.
A number of prominent studies of the first strand analyse de-tracking reforms in the Nordic
countries. Similar to my findings, they find reform-induced achievement gains for students from
lower socio-economic backgrounds (see Meghir and Palme, 2005, for Sweden; Aakvik et al., 2010,
for Norway; and Kerr et al., 2013, for Finland). Given that these reforms simultaneously changed
other features of the school system, like the minimum school-leaving age, the effects cannot be
unequivocally attributed to tracking, however. Analyses of Britain’s de-tracking reform, which all
use the fact that implementation was staggered across regions, have generated more mixed results.5
Pischke andManning (2006) argue that this is due to unobserved regional heterogeneity that cannot
sufficiently be controlled for with existing data sets.
An arguably cleaner natural experiment, yet more narrow in scope, is the experience of Northern
Ireland, which maintained its tracking system but increased the share of students admitted to the
high track. Interestingly, the findings concerning the top end of the achievement distribution
(medium high performers joining high performers) mirror mine for the bottom end (low performers
joining medium performers): weaker students’ gains from entering higher track environments are
large, whereas losses for the stronger students are small or absent (Guyon et al., 2012). Similarly,
Piopiunik (2014) finds that a reform-induced increase in tracking in the German state of Bavaria
led to achievement losses at the bottom.6 A potential explanation for these results (and mine) is
offered by Garlick (2018) who shows that low-achieving students are more sensitive to peer group
composition than high-achievers, explaining the negative net effect of a residential tracking policy
4This brief literature review focuses on papers analysing the systemic effects of between-school tracking. The
discussion of a large related literature on the effects of within-school streaming is deferred to the conclusion.
5See Kerckhoff et al. (1996); Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004); Pischke and Manning (2006).
6The Bavarian pre-post differences analysed by Piopiunik (2014) closely resemble the (contemporaneous) differ-
ences in tracking analysed in this paper. Reassuringly, his findings based on a single state’s reform are confirmed in
this study for the whole of Germany.
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in South Africa.
Studies of the second strand have employed different strategies to circumvent the potentially
severe endogeneity problems that come with between-country comparisons. One rather descriptive
strategy limits attention to inequality, comparing only family background effects between tracked
and untracked countries. These studies generally find that early between-school tracking is associ-
ated with steeper socio-economic gradients for student achievement (see e.g. Brunello and Checchi,
2007; Schütz et al., 2008).
A second strategy, introduced in a seminal paper by Hanushek and Wössmann (2006), is
based on the observation that primary school is comprehensive everywhere, regardless of how
the secondary school system looks. These studies use DD to estimate how test scores change
differently from primary to secondary school between countries with tracked and comprehensive
schooling. Most results indicate that tracking increases inequality in student achievement,7 though
Waldinger (2007) argues that these results are sensitive to the way countries are categorised into
tracked and untracked ones. This highlights a major problem of the cross-country literature: when
classifying countries as comprehensive or tracked, a range of quite heterogeneous between-school
tracking systems are lumped together and compared to an evenmore diverse group that includes both
comprehensive and within-school streaming systems. Hence, the treatment (and the counterfactual)
is not clearly defined. Other problems include that also changes in outcomes might be related to
unobserved differences between tracked and untracked countries (Betts, 2011) and the pooling of
incomparable test scores (Contini and Cugnata, 2016).
My study merges the approaches of the within- and the cross-country literatures. I adopt the
logic of Hanushek and Wössmann’s (2006) DD approach in comparing changes in test scores
between elementary and secondary school for the identification of the effect of tracking. Yet, the
fact that I exploit within- instead of cross-country differences allows me to improve on a number of
important points. First, apart from differences in tracking, school systems are strongly harmonised
between German states such that the treatment is clearly defined in my case. Therefore, second, the
common trends assumption necessary for DD is much more plausible in my setting than in previous
studies. Crucially, I can directly assess its plausibility ex post using academic-track students for
7Next to Hanushek and Wössmann (2006), see Ammermüller (2013) and Schwerdt and Ruhose (2016).
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whom there is no difference in tracking. Third, individual-level panel data allows me go beyond
mean effects and estimate how the effect of tracking depends on students’ position in the initial
achievement distribution. This is key given that the debate on tracking revolves around a perceived
efficiency-equity trade-off.
Finally, it is important to highlight that I estimate a systemic (state-level) effect of tracking,
which contrasts with a literature on marginal effects. For example, Dustmann et al. (2017) also
study the German context but, using an individual-level instrumental variables strategy, find no
effect of track placement on educational attainment or earnings for students at the margin between
two tracks.8 Though important for understanding the consequences of (mis)allocation of hard-to-
assign students to tracks given an early between-school tracking system, their estimate tells us little
about whether tracking is desirable in the first place. My results suggest that the separation of
students into different schools at an age as early as 10 depresses achievement for a sizeable group
of (non-marginal) low-achievers, thus putting them at a double disadvantage.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 lays out the institutional background and the
identification framework. Section 3 describes my data sources and presents descriptive findings.
Section 4 present the estimation results, including robustness checks and a discussion of potential
mechanisms. Finally, section 5 discusses implications and concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Research Design
2.1 The German School System and Heterogeneity Therein
In Germany, sovereignty over education policy lies with the state governments. In order to ensure
the comparability of educational standards and degrees, however, the federal StandingConference of
the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the States (Kultusministerkonferenz) harmonises
education policies between states considerably (Kultusministerkonferenz, 2014). Within this unique
situation of educational federalism, a school system has developed that is fairly homogeneous across
Germany in terms of basic structure, teaching methods and curricula, but exhibits fine differences
within some areas of schooling policy – especially, school structure and, thus, tracking practices.


























Figure 1. Schematic overview of the two tracking regimes in Germany.
Notes: For illustrative purposes the figure abstracts from the fact that in some of the three-tiered Tracked states there are some comprehensive
schools (see text and Table 1). Academic track = Gymnasium, Intermediate track = Realschule, Low track = Hauptschule, School with multiple
tracks (SMT) = Schule mit mehreren Bildungsgängen, Comprehensive schools = Integrierte Gesamtschule.
It is this heterogeneity within a context of general comparability that I exploit to shed light on the
impact of tracking on student achievement.
Throughout Germany, compulsory schooling starts at the age of 6 with primary school, which
covers the first four grade levels and is taught comprehensively with no ability grouping of students
within or between schools.9 Differences between states emerge after the end of comprehensive
primary school. They are summarised schematically in Figure 1.
The traditional (West) German secondary school system is three-tiered: upon leaving primary
school after fourth grade, i.e. around the age of 10, students are tracked into one of three vertically
ordered school types – Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium, representing low, intermediate
and academic track – based on their previous performance.10 These tracks lead to different school-
leaving certificates and differ substantially in terms of years of schooling, curriculum, teacher
certification and peer composition. The academic track (i.e. Gymnasium) has the most demanding
9In the two states of Berlin and Brandenburg, primary school lasts six years. For this reason, they are not part of
the analysis.
10In all states students receive a track recommendation by their teacher based on their performance in primary school.
Whether it is binding depends on the state. All results are fully robust to the inclusion of an indicator variable for
binding teacher recommendations (and that indicator variable always turns out to be insignificant itself; see Appendix
Table B2). Therefore, all that follows abstracts from this difference between states.
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curriculum, lasts eight or nine years and is the only track leading directly to a school-leaving
certificate that entitles to entry into university. This makes for a clear divide between the academic
and the non-academic segments of the school system (also in reputation). The intermediate track
(i.e. Realschule) provides general knowledge, lasts six years and is supposed to prepare students
for advanced vocational and professional education. If students complete the intermediate track
successfully and meet state-specific requirements they may upgrade to the academic track after
grade 10. The low track (i.e. Hauptschule) provides a more basic general education, lasts five or
six years and prepares students for technical vocational education. Also here, after completion,
upgrading to intermediate-track schools is possible under specific conditions.
Currently, five states still have the traditional three-tiered system (see Figure 2).11 The rest has
a two-tiered secondary school structure that distinguishes between academic- and non-academic-
track schools only. This group consists of three East German states, which never adopted the
three-tiered system, and four West German states that reformed their system.12
The East German states had to align their (comprehensive) school system with that of the
West after German reunification. This led to a compromise where the East adopted the three-
tiered differentiation in school-leaving certificates but opted for a two-tiered school structure
(Edelstein and Nikolai, 2013).13 Instead of separate low- and intermediate-track schools there is
only one non-academic school type, labelled ‘School with Multiple Tracks’ (Schule mit mehreren
Bildungsgängen; henceforth SMT). Here, all students not attending an academic-track Gymnasium
school are taught together. If a student leaves an SMT after five years (without failing the year,
of course) she receives the low degree. If she stays on for another year and attains the necessary
grades she earns the intermediate degree. Hence, the difference between the two systems is one of
tracking only.
In many Western states low-track schools have become stigmatised due to falling student
numbers and a lack of prospects for its graduates (Helbig and Nikolai, 2015). This led several states
to reform their school system along the lines of the two-tiered system. Like in the East, the three
11These are Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia.
12East German states: Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. West German states: Bremen, Hamburg, Saarland
and Schleswig-Holstein.
13Except for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, which initially adopted and briefly maintained a three-tiered system. For


















Two-tiered / "Comprehensive" Three-tiered / "Tracked" Excluded
Figure 2. German federal states coloured by tracking regime.
Notes: BW = Baden-Württemberg; BY = Bavaria; BE = Berlin; BB = Brandenburg; HB = Bremen; HH = Hamburg; HE = Hesse; MV =
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; NI = Lower Saxony; NW = North Rhine-Westphalia; RP = Rheinland-Pfalz; SL = Saarland; SN = Saxony; ST =
Saxony-Anhalt; SH = Schleswig-Holstein; TH = Thuringia.
different school-leaving certificates, as well as a distinct academic track, were retained, but separate
low- and intermediate-track schools were abolished and replaced with so-called ‘comprehensive
schools’ (Gesamtschule). Thus, just like SMTs in the East, these schools comprise all non-
academic-track students.14
While both SMTs and comprehensive schools track students internally in higher grades, they
are prohibited from doing so in the first two years of secondary schooling (i.e. in grades 5 and 6)
(Leschinsky, 2008). Instead, in these two grades classes continue to be formed disregarding ability
or previous performance. Only from grade 7 onwards these schools may track students by forming
track-specific classes (i.e. separate low- and intermediate-track classes) or by applying subject-
specific ability sorting.15 In most states, it is up to schools to decide if and how to group students
starting in grade 7 and, unfortunately, this information is not centrally collected. Accordingly,
14The difference between the East German SMTs and the West German comprehensive schools is that in the former
only the basic and intermediate degrees can be obtained, while in the latter, mostly, all three degrees can be earned
(Helbig and Nikolai, 2015). In practice, this difference is only relevant in much later grades than those studied here.
15Schools that use degree-specific within-school streaming from grade 7 onwards are labelled ‘cooperative’ while
those that generally continue to teach comprehensively, except for streaming in particular subjects, are called ‘integra-
tive’.
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between-state (and school) differences in higher grades are blurry. The first two years of secondary
school, however, provide a time window where institutional differences regarding the tracking of
students are clear-cut.
Comparability is further bolstered by the fact that the first two years in non-academic secondary
schools are strongly harmonised. Official information of the Kultusministerkonferenz (2014)
shows that curricula and learning goals for grades 5 and 6 in the non-academic tracks focus on the
acquisition of a standard set of basic general knowledge that is virtually indistinguishable between
states. By way of example, average weekly instruction hours in mathematics do not differ between
to the two-tiered (4.3 hours/week) and three-tiered states (4.4 hours/week).16 In most three-tiered
states, curricula for grades 5 and 6 do not even differ between low- and intermediate-track schools,
though the level of detail in which the material is treated might be higher in intermediate-track
schools (due to students’ higher ability levels) (Bald, 2011). States ensure the compatibility
of curricula during the first two years of secondary school because they formally allow for the
possibility to switch between tracks (Bellenberg, 2005). In practice, this happens quite rarely (only
about 5% of students switch according to Bellenberg, 2012).
The analysis below focuses on the cohort of students that entered fifth grade/secondary school
in 2010. The following summarises the previous discussion’s key points: In the four years prior
to the transition, all of these students attended comprehensive primary school. Moreover, in all
states the highest achieving students transition to separate academic-trackGymnasium schools. The
remaining non-academic-track students, however, are either further tracked between two different
school types (in states with the three-tiered regime) or taught comprehensively for another two
years (in states with the two-tiered regime).17 For ease of exposition, I will refer to the five states
with a three-tiered system as the ‘Tracked’ states and to the seven states with a two-tiered system
as the ‘Comprehensive’ states (see Figure 2). Four states with school systems that do not fit this
classification had to be excluded from the analysis.18
16These numbers are based on official time-table regulations for grades 5 and 6 in non-academic-track students
reported in Pant et al. (2013).
17For completeness, it should be mentioned that in some of the Tracked states municipalities are allowed to offer
comprehensive schools, where all three degrees can be earned, next to the ordinary schools of three-tiered system. For
the purposes of this paper this can be thought of as non-compliance with regards to the treatment of comprehensive
schooling (see section 3.4).
18Berlin, Brandenburg andMecklenburg-Vorpommern are excluded because the tracking decision is made after grade
6 instead of after grade 4. Rheinland-Palatinate is excluded because the state was transitioning from a three-tiered to
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2.2 Identification Strategy
The idea of this paper is to use the institutional differences in the non-academic segment of the
school system between Tracked and Comprehensive to learn about the effects of early between-
school ability tracking. The main challenge for this endeavour is that states’ tracking policies
might correlate with a whole range of other, potentially unobserved, factors determining student
achievement, like e.g. student body composition or early childhood education policies.19
To account for such unobserved differences between states, my identification strategy uses test
scores taken at two points in the educational career of students. The first achievement test is
administered right after primary school, at the beginning of grade 5, and the second two years later,
at the beginning of grade 7. All students are taught comprehensively in primary school. Hence,
grade 5 scores should be unaffected by tracking and capture achievement differences between states
unrelated to the tracking system. Grade 7 scores measure achievement right after exposure to either
treatment condition and thus reflect both causal effects from tracking and permanent between-state
differences. To purge the seventh-grade comparison between Comprehensive and Tracked states of
grade-constant confounders I thus propose the following difference-in-differences (DD) design:
Yisg = δ0 + δ1 Comprs + δ2 Grade7g + βDD (Compr × Grade7)sg + ψXisg + θs + uisg, (1)
where Yisg is the test score of non-academic-track student i in state s and grade level g ∈ {5,7},
Comprs and Grade7g are indicator variables for the Comprehensive states and grade 7 scores,
respectively, Xisg is a row vector of predetermined student and school covariates, discussed in
further detail below, and θs are state fixed effects.
In equation (1), δ1 absorbs level achievement differences between the two state groups at the
a two-tiered system during the period under investigation and, hence, its treatment status is ambiguous. While de jure
all separate low- and intermediate-track schools should have been closed by 2010, both the official statistics and the
current data set show some students entering such schools in 2010, indicating that de facto the fade-out took longer.
It seems that these schools were closed in the following years and students re-assigned. Administrative records show
that the cohort’s share of students in a low- or intermediate-track school declined from 8% in 2010 to 6% in 2011 to
3% in 2012 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011, 2012, 2013). A robustness check where Rheinland-Palatinate is assigned
the Tracked states (as initially there was some tracking) leaves all results unchanged (see Appendix Table B2).
19Formally, let Y1isg denote the (potential) achievement of student i in state s in grade g under tracking and Y
0
isg
(potential) achievement under comprehensive schooling. The identification challenge is that the average treatment
effect is not generally equal to the observed mean difference between Tracked (Comprs = 0) and Comprehensive
(Comprs = 1) states: τATE = E[Y1is7 − Y
0
is7] , E[Yis7 |Comprs = 0] − E[Yis7 |Comprs = 1].
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end of primary school, while δ2 absorbs general achievement trends between grades. Accordingly,
the DD estimate βDD captures the differential development of non-academic-track students in the
two-tiered system compared to the three-tiered system. To interpret βDD as the causal effect of
comprehensive versus tracked schooling we require two assumptions: first, that primary school
achievement is indeed unaffected by the structure of the secondary school system and, second, that
in the absence of differences in tracking, non-academic-track achievement would have developed
in parallel between Comprehensive and Tracked states.20
A threat to the first assumption are incentive effects: knowing that they will be placed in
different tracks depending on their performance in primary school, students might increase their
study efforts already prior to the start of tracking in more tracked regimes (Eisenkopf, 2007).
Below I explore the importance of this mechanism directly by comparing the two state groups’
achievement trends in primary school. For now, however, note that the test scores used in this paper
are not used for students’ track placement, ruling out immediate incentive effects related to the
tests. Further, note that the presence of the academic track creates strong performance incentives
for ambitious students (and their parents) in both regimes, dramatically limiting the importance of
this mechanism compared to previous applications.
With respect to the second, ‘common trends’ assumption, a standard concern in DD designs
is sample compositions changing differentially between treatment and control groups between
periods. Given that I am comparing one cohort across grade levels this is unlikely to play an
important role: students would need to strategically move to another state or from academic to
non-academic tracks (or vice versa) after having started secondary school. I will confirm that this
is not the case by means of balance tests on an array of observed predetermined student covariates
and, additionally, condition on these covariates, Xisg, in the DD regression.
20Continuing the potential outcomes notation from above, formally, we require the following two assumptions:{





E[Y0is7 |Comprs = 0] − E[Y
0
is5 |Comprs = 0] = E[Y
0
is7 |Comprs = 1] − E[Y
0
is5 |Comprs = 1] (Common trends)
Then, DD identifies the average treatment effect on the treated, i.e. the effect of tracked versus comprehensive schooling
for (non-academic-track) students from the Tracked states: τATT = E[Y1is7 − Y
0
is7 |Comprs = 0] = {E[Yis7 |Comprs =
0]−E[Yis5 |Comprs = 0]} − {E[Yis7 |Comprs = 1]−E[Yis5 |Comprs = 1]} = −βDD . (I define comprehensive schooling
as the treatment and tracking as the control condition in the regression formulation because in Germany it is more
intuitive to think of the newer two-tiered system as the treatment. This is without loss of generality.)
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In the current setting, the more serious threats to the common trends assumption come from
two sources: systematic differences between the two state groups in student composition and in
schooling inputs. Regarding the former, there are, indeed, non-negligible differences in student
bodies between Comprehensive and Tracked states (see Table 1). If, by the end of primary school,
the achievement of different types of students not only differs in levels but also continues to develop
differently, DD is biased because it merely removes grade-constant achievement differences. To
address this concern, I increase the flexibility of the (conditional) DD model by adding interactions
between predetermined student characteristics, Xisg, and grade level. This allows for different
development trajectories for different types of students. The sensitivity of the DD estimate to this
exercise is informative of the extent to which such confounding might play a role.
Turning to the latter, note that different schooling inputs in lower secondary school can be
considered ‘co-treatments’: factors other than tracking that change differently between states
between primary and secondary school. In that case, the DD estimate would no longer represent
the sole effect of tracking but include the effect of other features of the school environment. To
see if differently equipped secondary schools between Comprehensive and Tracked states play an
important confounding role, we can proceed as before and inspect the sensitivity of βDD to the
addition of school input measures to the control set.
Even if these exercises leave the DD estimate unchanged, concerns about unobserved grade-
specific differences between states that violate the common trends assumption might remain.
Fortunately, the current setting offers the unique opportunity for an additional test. As explained
in the previous section, the distinction between the Comprehensive and Tracked States is only
meaningful for students in the non-academic tracks. For academic-track students, there is no
difference between the two regimes as they enterGymnasium schools after fourth grade everywhere.
Under the assumption that selection into the academic track does not differ between the two state
groups, they can, therefore, be used as a control group to test for potential regime-specific trends
in achievement that the DD model does not pick up.21
This additional control group comparison is easily implemented by the following difference-in-
difference-in-differences (DDD), or triple-differences, model, which is estimated over all students
21The crucial assumption that selection into the academic track is identical between the two state groups is discussed
in further detail and tested below.
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and hence adds the subscript t ∈ {academic, non-academic} for track:
Yistg = λsg + φtg + µst + βDDD (Compr × Grade7 × NonAcad)stg + ψXistg + eistg, (2)
where NonAcadt is an indicator variable for non-academic-track students, λsg, φtg and µst are
state-grade, track-grade and state-track fixed effects, respectively, and the remaining variables are
defined as before. The triple interaction takes value one for grade 7 observations of non-academic-
track students in the Comprehensive states. Accordingly, the DDD estimate βDDD measures how
comprehensively taught non-academic-track students progress differently in the first two years
of secondary school net of state-specific achievement trends as approximated by academic-track
students.
If the estimates for βDDD and βDD are roughly identical this indicates that achievement trends
in the academic track are roughly identical in Tracked and Comprehensive states. This should
increase one’s confidence that there are no state-specific trends confounding the DD estimate from
above and that the assumptions for it to be interpreted causally hold. If the two estimates differ,
then there are divergent trends in the academic track. Causal interpretation of DDD then hinges on
the assumption that academic-track students provide an good approximation of non-academic-track
students’ counterfactual achievement trends.
In terms of inference, the group-level treatment variable means that I need to account for
clustering at the state level when estimating the above regression models (Bertrand et al., 2004;
Abadie et al., 2017). As in the current setting there are only twelve states, the large sample
assumptions necessary for a conventional cluster robust variance estimator are unlikely to hold
(Mackinnon and Webb, 2017). Therefore, throughout this paper, inference is based on a wild
cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al., 2008), which has been shown to perform well in settings with
few clusters (e.g. Mackinnon and Webb, 2017).22
22The wild cluster bootstrap permutes the outcome variable based on ‘restricted’ residuals (i.e. those stemming
from coefficient estimates that impose the null hypothesis to be tested) and weights from a Rademacher distribution.
Webb (2014) shows that with 12 or less clusters, a specific six-point distribution is preferable over the Rademacher
distribution. Hence, I implement the latter. However, results do not substantially differ between the standard (Cameron
et al., 2008), an unrestricted (Mackinnon and Webb, 2017) or a schools-as-‘sub-clusters’-of-states (MacKinnon and
Webb, 2018) version of the bootstrap.
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3 Data, Descriptive Statistics and Preliminaries
3.1 Data Sources and Analysis Samples
In this section, I present a brief overview of the data used in this study. For a more detailed
discussion of the data sets used, the construction of my samples, as well as sample diagnostics the
interested reader is referred to Appendix A.
3.1.1 National Educational Panel Study (NEPS)
The main empirical analysis is based on data from Starting Cohort 3 (SC3) of the multi-cohort
German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) (Blossfeld et al., 2011). The NEPS-SC3 survey
randomly sampled from the population of newly minted fifth-graders in the school year 2010/11
and, thereafter, followed this cohort over time as it progressed through grade levels of the German
school system.
Student achievement is measured using the NEPS-SC3’s competence tests in mathematics and
reading.23 The first round of tests was administered in autumn of 2010, two to four months into
students’ first year of secondary school. Hence, the grade 5 scores should not yet be severely
affected by students’ secondary school environment and can be conceptualised as the pre-tracking
measure of achievement required by the DD design. Note that the DD estimate is attenuated towards
zero to the extent that grade 5 scores are already affected by tracking.24 Accordingly, my estimates
should be conservative. Restricting the sample to students on regular schools in one of the twelve
states under investigation, the NEPS-SC3 grade 5 cross-section comprises 4,448 students with
non-missing test scores, of whom 2,303 are in the non-academic tracks, of whom 330 are from the
Comprehensive states.25
23While, in principle, the NEPS also assesses competencies in other domains, only in maths and reading testing
commenced in the first wave of the survey. As the DD design requires pre-treatment outcomes, my analysis restricts
attention to maths and reading achievement.
24This is because any differences in achievement between states caused by the first couple of months of tracking are
absorbed in the baseline and thus cancelled out in the calculation of the double difference. Note that this unless the
effect of tracking reverses within the first couple of months of exposure: if the very short-term effects of tracking (i.e.
the effects on achievement after 3 months of exposure) are opposite to the longer-term effects of tracking I am trying
to estimate (i.e. the effects on achievement after 2 years of exposure), the DD estimate could theoretically by biased
upwards. As the effects reproduce in the IQB data, which measures pre-tracking achievement at the end of fourth
grade, this does not seem to be the case.
25Note that smaller number of observations in Comprehensive states simply reflects that these states are smaller and
less populous than the Tracked states (also see the map in Figure 2).
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Students were tested again two years later, at the beginning of the 2012/13 school year, when the
cohort in question had just entered seventh grade. The NEPS-SC3 grade 7 cross-section comprises
5,316 students with non-missing test scores, of whom 2,771 are in the non-academic tracks, of
whom 552 are from the Comprehensive states. It consists of students who were already part of
the survey in fifth grade and a large randomly drawn refreshment sample to counteract attrition,
explaining the larger sample sizes.
As repeated cross-sections suffice for estimating the main DD and DDD models, for these re-
gressions I simply pool the NEPS-SC3 grade 5 and grade 7 cross-sections. The resulting NEPS DD
sample includes only non-academic-track students and comprises 5,074 student×grade observations
(882 of which are from the Comprehensive states). The NEPS DDD sample adds academic-track
students as an additional control group for, in total, 9,764 student×grade observations (1,711 of
which are from the Comprehensive states). I standardise the maths and reading test scores to have
mean zero and standard deviation one in the group of Tracked states’ non-academic-track students
(i.e. the ‘control group’), separately by grade level. Accordingly, all treatment effects in this paper
can be interpreted in standard deviations of test scores.26
In contrast to estimation based only on the panel sample, my use of repeated cross-sections
retains students who drop out between waves and includes the refreshment sample. This has
two advantages: First, it maximises sample sizes and, hence, precision in the estimation of my
main models – a key concern given the NEPS’ humble sample sizes in the Comprehensive states.
Second, the use of the refreshment sample reduces sample selection bias due to attrition. This is
because panel non-response is negatively related to achievement and, hence, attrition is substantially
higher in the non-academic tracks (29% compared to 13% in the academic track). The majority
of observations in the refreshment sample are from the non-academic tracks (63%), thus restoring
the representativeness of my sample. Note that there are no significant differences in student-level
attrition between the Tracked and Comprehensive states.27
26Note that the NEPS competence tests are designed to measure the progress of students on one scale across grade
levels. This ‘linking’ of scales is achieved through the recurrence of certain anchor items in each wave of the test
(see Fischer et al., 2016, for details). For simplicity and in contrast to an earlier version of this paper (Matthewes,
2018), I nonetheless standardise scores within each grade level. As the DD design identifies a seventh-grade-specific
treatment effect it is more intuitive to interpret the estimates in seventh-grade standard deviations. Results are virtually
unchanged when using a cross-grade standardisation scheme, however.
27See Appendix A for a detailed analysis of panel attrition in the NEPS-SC3.
17
Nevertheless, for a number of heterogeneity analyses I leverage the panel structure of the NEPS
and use the sub-sample of students for whom I observe both grade 5 and grade 7 test scores. This
NEPS 5-to-7 panel sample comprises 3,521 students, of whom 1,646 are in the non-academic
tracks, of whom 269 are from the Comprehensive states.
Finally, a third round of achievement tests was administered in the 2014/15 school year, when
the cohort in question was in ninth grade. The grade 9 tests are used to assess effect persistence.
To probe the robustness of the DD estimates to the inclusion of controls for student characteris-
tics, I draw on detailed information from the NEPS’ student and parent questionnaires. In particular,
I construct the following student-level control variables: age, sex, migration background, single
parent household, foreign language spoken at home, highest level of parental education measured in
four categories, monthly household income, receipt of unemployment benefits and a standardised
index for home possessions.
Additionally, I use information from the principal and teacher questionnaires to construct the
following school-level controls, aimed to capture school quality independent of tracking: average
teacher age, days of further training received by teachers over the past year, school size measured
by the number of students per cohort, student-teacher ratio and four composite indices for schools’
facilities; extracurricular programmes; educational support offers and quality control measures.28
Note that pre-treatment achievement (i.e. grade 5 scores) is a function of primary school inputs,
whereas post-treatment achievement (i.e. grade 7 scores) is a function of secondary school inputs.
However, only the secondary school environment is observed in the NEPS-SC3 as it commenced
in fifth grade. Thus, to impute the missing primary school inputs in the DD sample, I use data
from the NEPS’ primary school cohort, Starting Cohort 2 (NEPS-SC2). In particular, I calculate
state-level averages for all school-level controls in the primary school data and assign each grade 5
observations in the DD sample its state-level average.
Moreover, I use the NEPS’ primary school cohort to investigate pre-tracking achievement
trends. For this, I apply the DD model of equation (1) to grade 2 and grade 4 mathematics test
scores from the NEPS-SC2.29 The NEPS-SC2 follows a later cohort than the NEPS-SC3 but, given
that there were no major changes to primary education in Germany in this time period, their trends
28For more information on these indices see Appendix A.
29Unfortunately, reading scores are not available for these grades.
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should be similar.
3.1.2 IQB National Assessment Studies
Next to the panel structure that can be exploited for heterogeneity analyses, the main advantage of
the NEPS is that it measures student achievement in seventh grade, right after exposure to either
treatment condition and when between-state differences in tracking and other school policies are
still clear-cut. Its main downside is the modest number of observations in the Comprehensive
states, raising concerns about sampling variation. As a robustness check, I therefore double check
my results using two large cross-sectional student assessments carried out by the Institute for
Educational Quality Improvement (IQB).
The IQB studies do not randomly sample from the population of all students in a particular
grade level like the NEPS but, instead, draw separate random samples of roughly similar sizes
within each state. Hence, in the IQB data I achieve much larger samples with rough parity in the
number of observations between Tracked and Comprehensive states. Due to this sampling design
all analyses with the IQB data use student sampling weights to obtain estimates representative
of Germany. The IQB data’s main downside is that post-treatment outcomes are measured in
ninth grade, meaning that the estimates represent a mixture of effect persistence and effects from
continued (but somewhat unclear) differences in tracking and other schooling inputs.
The IQB National Assessment Study 2011 (IQB11) tested fourth-graders in maths, reading and
listening at the end of the 2010/11 school year, when students were at the end of their primary school
time (see Stanat et al., 2012, for details). This is one cohort later than that of the main analysis
(see Appendix Figure A1), so that my analysis with the IQB data operates under the assumption
that these two consecutive cohorts’ primary school experiences match. Fourth-grade students are
not yet assigned to academic- or non-academic tracks, but testing happened late enough in the
school year for students’ secondary school and, hence, track to be determined already. This allows
me to classify students as non-academic or academic using information provided by parents and
teachers.30 The IQB11 grade 4 cross-section comprises 18,904 students on regular schools with
non-missing test scores, of whom 11,158 are assigned the non-academic tracks, of whom 6,573 are
30The details of the classification procedure are described in Appendix A.
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from the Comprehensive states.
The IQBNational Assessment Study 2015 (IQB15) tested ninth-graders in reading and listening
at the end of the 2014/15 school year, which is the same cohort as in the main analysis (see Stanat
et al., 2016, for details). All analyses with the IQB15 data restrict attention to students on
regular non-academic-track schools with non-missing test scores. The non-academic-track IQB15
grade 9 cross-section comprises 13,742 students, of whom 7,009 are from the Comprehensive
states. Analogously to above, I pool the non-academic parts of the IQB11 grade 4 and the IQB15
grade 9 cross-sections to construct the IQB DD sample, which comprises 24,900 student×grade
observations (13,582 of which are from the Comprehensive states).
3.2 Descriptives and Balance Tests
The first two columns of Table 1 compare Comprehensive and Tracked states in terms of the
distribution of students over tracks (panel A), pre-tracking achievement (panel B) and student
characteristics (panel C) in the non-academic-track NEPS DD sample. For reference, column 5
describes academic-track students.
I discuss panel A below. First, note that pre-tracking achievement in panel B is extremely
well balanced between the two state groups, as indicated by small and insignificant differences in
test scores at the beginning of secondary school. Though pre-treatment balance in outcomes (or
covariates) is not technically required by the DD design, this should raise one’s confidence that
student achievement is generally comparable between Comprehensive and Tracked states. Stark
differences in mean scores between non-academic- and academic-track students of (more than) one
standard deviation indicate that track assignment is very much a function of achievement despite the
absence of strict cut-off rules. Consequently, the treatment variation in the non-academic segment
of the school system analysed in this paper concerns a negatively selected group of students. Still,
test score distributions of academic- and non-academic-track students overlap substantially (see
next section).
In terms of student characteristics, panel C of Table 1 showsmoderate compositional differences
between the two state groups, highlighting that simple cross-sectional comparisons between states
might well be confounded. On the one hand, the Comprehensive states, composed mostly of the
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and balance tests in the NEPS data.
Non-academic tracks Academic
Compr. Tracked p-value p-value track
states states (1)=(2) DD=0 (both)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Distribution over tracks/school types
Share non-academic track 0.52 0.52 (0.96) (0.44) –
Of those:
Low-track school 0.00 0.32 – – –
Intermediate-track school 0.00 0.55 – – –
Comprehensive/SMT school 1.00 0.12 – – –
Panel B: Pre-treatment outcomes
Grade 5 maths score 0.06 0.00 (0.66) – 1.28
Grade 5 reading score 0.01 -0.00 (0.93) – 0.99
Panel C: Student characteristics
Female (binary) 0.47 0.50 (0.02) (0.92) 0.51
Age in fifth grade (in years) 11.00 10.96 (0.46) (0.10) 10.67
Single parent household (binary) 0.20 0.13 (0.07) (0.56) 0.08
Migration background (binary) 0.18 0.32 (0.05) (0.72) 0.23
Foreign language at home (binary) 0.09 0.14 (0.17) (0.90) 0.10
Highest parental education level:
None, low, intermediate w/o appr. 0.16 0.28 (0.07) (0.84) 0.06
Intermediate w/ apprenticeship 0.48 0.38 (0.31) (0.59) 0.24
Academic track, some college 0.27 0.25 (0.77) (0.62) 0.36
University degree 0.09 0.09 (0.91) (0.13) 0.34
Monthly household income (in Euros) 2781 3072 (0.12) (0.73) 4070
Unemployment benefits (binary) 0.20 0.11 (0.07) (0.79) 0.03
Home possessions (index) -0.31 -0.26 (0.39) (0.55) 0.24
Observations 882 4192 4690
Notes: Table 1 reports the distribution of students over tracks, as well as variable means for pre-treatment test scores and student covariates in the
pooled grade 5 and grade 7 NEPS data. The first two columns describe the NEPS DD sample of non-academic-track students, separately by state
group. Academic-track students, who are added as an additional control group in the DDD model, are described in column 5 (for brevity not split by
state group). Corresponding to the later regressions, the shares in panel A and grade 5 test scores in panel B are unweighted. The remainder of the
table uses student sampling weights to reflect the underlying populations as accurately as possible. Column 3 reports p-values from testing whether
covariate means are equal in the Comprehensive and Tracked states. Column 4 reports p-values from testing for zero double differences (i.e. the
second difference between the Comprehensive and Tracked states between grade 5 and grade 7). This tests whether the parallel trends assumption
holds for the respective covariate. All tests are based on 999 wild cluster bootstrap iterations, clustering at the state level and using Webb weights.
poorer East German states and city states, score slightly worse on socio-economic variables like
household income and unemployment. On the other hand, they have lower shares of students
with migration background, mainly reflecting the different migration histories of West and East
Germany. Importantly, however, column 4 shows that there is no significant double difference in
any of the covariates, indicating that these differences in sample composition stay roughly constant
between grades. Appendix Table B1 provides a detailed comparison of school characteristics in
primary and secondary school in both the NEPS and the IQB data, which has considerably more
power for inference at the school level, to show that the same holds true for these. As, especially
among the school-level covariates, some of the level differences are not small the analysis below
will pay close attention to the sensitivity of the DD estimates to the inclusion of these controls,
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Figure 3. Pre-tracking test score distributions by track and tracking regime.
Notes: Figure 3 shows kernel density estimates of different test score distributions for all, only non-academic-track and only academic-track students,
separately for Comprehensive and Tracked states. All density estimates use a Gaussian kernel with optimal bandwidth for normally distributed
variables (Silverman, 1986). Panels A and B are based on the NEPS-SC3 grade 5 cross-section. Panels C, D and E are based on the IQB11 grade 4
cross-section, using the first plausible value of each test score and student sampling weights.
despite the insignificance of the presented balance tests.
3.3 Selection into the Academic Track
The treatment a student receives depends on her state of residence (Tracked or Comprehensive)
and whether she is assigned the academic track or not. My identification strategy requires that
selection into the academic track does not differ between the two state groups. Otherwise, neither
the academic-track nor the non-academic-track student bodies would be comparable. Panel A of
Table 1 shows that the non-academic-track sample shares are 52% in both state groups. Academic-
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track students appear to be slightly overrepresented in the NEPS, as according to administrative
records the true non-academic shares for the cohort in question are 60% and 57% in Tracked and
Comprehensive states, respectively (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011). Reassuringly, the shares are
very similar both in the population and in my sample.
Equal shares leave open the possibility of compositional differences, however. For example, it
is conceivable that competition for the academic track is stronger when there are only two tracks,
because the alternative school type necessarily comprises all low-achievers. This might amplify
average ability differences between academic and non-academic tracks in two-tiered versus three-
tiered systems. To test for the presence of such differences in selection, Figure 3 plots pre-tracking
test score distributions by state group, both overall and for academic and non-academic-track
students separately. Panels A and B refer to the (beginning of) grade 5 maths and reading scores
from the NEPS and panels C through D refer to the (end of) grade 4 maths, reading and listening
scores from the IQB11 data. Across achievement domains and data sets, the distributions look very
similar in Tracked and Comprehensive states; in particular, the gaps between the academic- and
non-academic-track distributions do not seem to differ between states. Correspondingly, the mean
gap between non-academic- and academic-track students does not significantly differ between the
two states groups for any of the five scores.31 Therefore, I conclude that selection into the academic
track does not meaningfully differ between the two state groups.32
3.4 Distribution over Non-Academic Tracks
Panel A of Table 1 reports the distribution of non-academic-track students over different school
types by state group. In the Tracked states one third of students attend low-track schools and about
half attend intermediate-track schools. In the counterfactual scenario of a two-tiered school system
these two groups would be taught together instead of being separated into different tracks. Note that
a small percentage of students in the Tracked states (12%) attends comprehensive schools where
31The wild cluster bootstrapped p-values for these ‘differences in differences’ are 0.82 for maths and 0.60 for reading
in the NEPS and 0.58 for maths, 0.55 for reading and 0.18 for listening in the IQB data.
32It might seem puzzling that alternative choice options are largely irrelevant for selection into the academic track.
It likely is explained by the special status of the academic-track Gymnasium in Germany: virtually all ambitious and
high-SES students will aspire to the academic track regardless of what other school forms are present because of
its reputation and academic focus (Paulus and Blossfeld, 2007). For example, in my sample 78% of students with
college-educated parents attend the academic track.
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Figure 4. Effect of tracking on peer group composition.
Notes: All curves show fitted values from student-level local constant regressions of mean classroom test scores in maths (Panel A) and reading
(Panel B) on students’ own test score, separately for the Tracked and Comprehensive states. The fitted values are evaluated at each percentile of
the respective test score distributions. The left-hand side figures are based on the IQB11 grade 4 cross-section (restricted to students classified
as non-academic), thus describing the relation between own and classroom peers’ performance at the end of primary school, right before tracking
commences. The right-hand side figures are based on the NEPS-SC3 grade 5 cross-section (restricted to non-academic-track students), thus
describing the same relation a couple of months later, when students have been tracked according to the state-specific rules. The shaded areas show
pointwise 95% confidence intervals from 999 iterations of a percentile bootstrap, clustering at the classroom level.
all three degrees can be obtained and there might or might not be within-school streaming.33 In
the language of the treatment effects literature, these students can be thought of as ‘always-takers’,
slightly attenuating my ‘intent-to-treat’ effect estimates towards zero.
In the Comprehensive states, there are no low- and intermediate-track schools. All non-
academic-track students in these states attend SMT or comprehensive schools. As explained above,
there is no within-school streaming in grades 5 and 6 in these schools. It is the effect of this
comprehensive schooling for non-academic track students in the two-tiered regime, as compared
33These sample shares are very close to the true population shares: 32% low-track, 51% intermediate-track and 17%
comprehensive schools (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011).
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to the between-school tracking in the three tiered-regime, that I aim to estimate.
3.5 Peer Group Composition
To get a better idea of what these differences in tracking mean from the perspective of students,
Figure 4 explores how tracking affects students’ peer group composition. Using the IQB11 (end
of) grade 4 test scores in maths (panel A) and reading (panel B), the left-hand panels compare the
relationship between students’ own achievement and that of their classroom peers between Com-
prehensive and Tracked states in the final year of primary school, right before tracking commences.
Using the NEPS (beginning of) grade 5 scores, the right-hand panels depict the same relationship
a couple of months later,34 when students have been tracked according to the state-specific rules.
Despite the absence of tracking, the relationship between students’ own achievement and that
of their peers is clearly positive already in primary school, representing residential sorting.35
Importantly, however, this relation looks very similar in both state groups. If anything, the gradient
for maths is slightly steeper in the Comprehensive states. With the transition to secondary school,
this relationship changes quite dramatically between the two state groups. Now, the gradient ismuch
steeper in the Tracked states, where non-academic-track students are assigned to different schools
based on their previous performance, than in the Comprehensive states, where classes continue
to be formed disregarding previous performance.36 These differences in classroom heterogeneity
form the core of the (composite) treatment of comprehensive versus tracked schooling.
4 Results
4.1 Level Effects of Comprehensive versus Tracked Schooling
This section presents my findings on the average effect of comprehensive, as compared to tracked,
schooling in the first two years of lower secondary school for non-academic-track students. For
34Note that this is under the assumption that this relation stayed constant between the two consecutive cohorts that
are tested in IQB11 and NEPS-SC3.
35There are much more primary than secondary schools in Germany, such that students generally attend schools
closer to home and residential sorting plays a larger role.
36Note that one cannot meaningfully compare the slopes between primary and secondary school without very strong
assumptions, as IQB and NEPS differ in their test design and thus do not measure achievement on the same scale.
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Figure 5. Distribution of grade-5-to-7 gain-scores by track and tracking regime.
Notes: Figure 5 shows kernel density estimates of the grade-5-to-7 gain score distribution in maths (Panel A) and reading (Panel B), separately for
Comprehensive and Tracked states, for non-academic-track (left) and academic-track students (right). All density estimates use a Gaussian kernel
with optimal bandwidth for normally distributed variables (Silverman, 1986). Estimates are based on the NEPS 5-to-7 panel sample (N = 1, 646).
illustrative purposes, I begin by comparing students’ progress between Tracked and Comprehensive
states graphically. Using the NEPS 5-to-7 panel sample, Figure 5 plots kernel density estimates of
gain-score (∆7Yis = Yis7−Yis5) distributions in maths and reading for academic- and non-academic-
track students in both tracking regimes. A striking picture emerges: whereas academic-track
students’ progress is very similar between regimes in both domains – if anything, those in the
Tracked states progress slightlymore inmaths – for non-academic-track students theComprehensive
states’ distribution of gains appears to stochastically dominate that of the Tracked states. These
graphs provide strong initial evidence for the existence of efficiency gains from comprehensive
schooling. In the following, I assess the significance and robustness of this descriptive finding
more formally by estimating the DD and DDD models.
Column 1 of Table 2 displays the regression results for the simple (unsaturated) DD model,
corresponding to equation (1) without control variables and state fixed effects, estimated using the
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non-academic NEPS DD sample. The results for maths are presented in panel A and those for
reading in panel B. Next to point estimates, in parentheses I present p-values and in brackets 95%
studentised bootstrap confidence intervals from 999 wild cluster bootstrap iterations, clustering at
the state level.37 As indicated by small and insignificant coefficients on the Comprehensive states
indicator, there seem to be no substantial level achievement differences between the two state groups
prior to tracking. The DD coefficients, equal to the (double) difference between Comprehensive
and Tracked states’ achievement changes between grades 5 and 7, indicate that comprehensively
taught non-academic-track students progress about 0.18 standard deviations (SD) more in maths
and 0.26 SD more in reading, confirming the graphical finding from above.
The next columns probe the robustness of this result, following the steps outlined in section
2: Column 2 presents the saturated DD model, which replaces the Comprehensive states indicator
with state fixed effects for increased flexibility and precision. Column 3 adds the complete set
of student covariates, described in Table 1, to correct for potential compositional changes in the
sample. Column 4 interacts the vector of student covariates with the grade 7 indicator to allow
for different development trajectories for different types of students. Finally, column 5 adds the
complete set of school covariates to control for potential differences in schooling inputs.
Considering the overall level of imprecision in the estimates due to the moderate number
of observations in the Comprehensive states, the DD estimate stays remarkably stable across
all specifications. As the student control variables in the NEPS are very detailed, substantially
increasing the model’s explanatory power as evidenced by the sharp increase in R2 between
columns 2 and 3, it is very unlikely that between-state differences in student body composition
explain the advantage for comprehensively taught students. Despite my controls for schooling
inputs being somewhat less detailed, the fact that the DD estimate increases upon their inclusion
provides strong evidence against the (null) hypothesis that the effects are driven by differences
in schooling inputs. Appendix Table B2 further corroborates the robustness of the DD results to
alternative model specifications and the inclusion of further potential confounders at the school
(e.g. private schools and class size) and state level (e.g. binding track recommendations and school
37Note that in my case inference based on the wild cluster bootstrap is strictly more conservative than inference
based on conventional cluster-robust standard errors, clustered at the state level (which in turn is more conservative
than clustering at the state-track level, which in turn is more conservative than clustering at the school level). For




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Despite the stability of the DD estimate across different control sets of varying flexibility,
concerns about non-parallel (counterfactual) achievement trends might remain. Hence, as a more
design- and less covariate-based test for the common trends assumption, column 6 presents the
uncontrolled DDD model that uses academic-track students, for whom there are no differences
in tracking between states, as an additional control group. Columns 7–9 add control variables
analogously to before. As to be expected the DDD estimates are less precise than the ones from
DD, but, reassuringly, they are very similar inmagnitude – if anything, slightly larger. The similarity
between the double- and triple-difference estimates implies that there are no divergent achievement
trends between the Comprehensive and Tracked states in the academic track, which suggests that
the different trends in the non-academic tracks are indeed due to differences in tracking.
Given the small number of states it is important to check that the results are not driven by
any particular outlier state whose performance diverged extremely from the others. To this end
I perform a simple leave-one-out analysis. Figure 6 plots coefficient estimates against p-values
from repeatedly re-estimating the DD and DDD models eat time leaving out one state. While the
precision is slightly affected when some (larger) states are dropped, the results appear robust to the
exclusion of any particular state.
Given that differences in tracking between states only emerge with students’ transition to sec-
ondary school, a natural requirement for interpreting my results causally is that Comprehensive and
Tracked states exhibit parallel achievement trends in primary school, prior to tracking. Inspecting
such pre-trends also allows to test for the presence of the discussed anticipation effects of tracking
38In particular, I first add all school controls separately to ensure that coefficient movements are largely homogeneous
across variables (columns 2–9). Then, I show robustness to applying student sampling weights (column 11) and using
the unsaturated DD specification (column 12). Next, I interact the school controls with grade level just like the student
controls (column 13). This drastically increases imprecision, as the data lacks power to allow this degree of flexibility
at the school level – especially since in grade 5 these variables only vary at the state level. Still, point estimates are
rather similar. Finally, in columns 14–19 I show that results are fully robust to controlling for a school-level indicator
for private schools (which is excluded in the main regressions because there are so few private schools in the NEPS
that the imputed primary school state averages are highly unrepresentative); a school-level measure of average class
size (which is excluded because it is arguably a ‘bad control’: class sizes are likely to be a function of how students
are sorted – e.g. low-track schools tend to have smaller class sizes); the time students are back in school since the end
of the summer break at the day of testing; a state-level measure of per pupil public expenditure for schools (which is
excluded because its comparability across states is somewhat doubtful, mainly because both living expenses and teacher
salary-unrelated expenditures vary greatly between states); a state-level indicator for binding teacher recommendations
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Figure 6. Leave-one-state-out DD and DDD estimates.
Notes: Figure 6 compares the DD and DDD estimates for the effect of comprehensive schooling on seventh-grade maths (Panel A) and reading
(Panel B) scores in the original sample with those obtained when excluding single states. Point estimates on the horizontal axis are plotted against
p-values testing the null of no effect on the vertical axis, obtained from 999 wild cluster bootstrap iterations using Webb weights, clustering at the
state level. Each panel has 13 data points: one triangle showing the original estimate and 12 circles showing the estimates when excluding each
state. State names cannot be revealed for data confidentiality reasons.
in secondary school on pre-tracking achievement. To this end, I first apply the unsaturated DD
model from equation (1) to grade 2 and 4 maths scores in the NEPS primary school cohort and find
no differences in second-grade achievement (δ1 = 0.043; p = 0.77) or achievement growth in the
two years prior to tracking (βDD = −0.015; p = 0.77).39
This result concerns all and not only non-academic-track students: as students are not yet
assigned to tracks in primary school I cannot restrict the sample accordingly. To investigate pre-
trends specifically for lower achieving students, who are more likely to attend non-academic-track
schools later on, second, I leverage the NEPS’ panel structure and investigate achievement growth
by previous achievement. In particular, using the NEPS 2-to-4 panel sample comprising all students
39See Appendix Table B3 for the complete regression results. Note that I cannot inspect pre-trends for reading, as




















0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentiles of grade 2 mathematics score
Placebo effect: difference b/n
Compr. and Tracked states
Pointwise 95 percent CI
Figure 7. Pre-tracking achievement trends by previous performance.
Notes: Figure 7 shows the difference in average second to fourth grade achievement growth between Comprehensive and Tracked states across the
grade 2 maths score distribution. Estimation is based on the primary school NEPS-SC2 2-to-4 panel sample that includes all students for whom both
grade 2 and grade 4 maths scores are observed (N = 4, 676). The curve is constructed as follows: First, separately for Comprehensive and Tracked
states, I estimate a student-level local constant regression of grade-2-to-4 gain scores on grade 2 test scores. Second, I calculate the difference
between Comprehensive and Tracked states’ fitted values at every fourth percentile of the grade 2 distribution. Third, I construct pointwise 95%
confidence intervals from a percentile bootstrap with 999 iterations, clustering at the state level, stratifying by tracking regime and holding the
bandwidth constant across bootstrap iteration (Hall and Kang, 2001).
for whom I observe both second and fourth grade maths scores, I non-parametrically estimate the
difference in grade 2-to-4 gain scores between Comprehensive and Tracked states at different
percentile of the grade 2 test score distribution.40 The results, presented in Figure 7, indicate that
achievement growth in the two years prior to tracking is indeed roughly parallel across the entire
achievement distribution.
In summary, this section showed that achievement levels in the non-academic tracks diverge
between Comprehensive and Tracked states during the first two years of secondary school. The
presented evidence suggests that this divergence is caused by differences in ability grouping:
comprehensive, instead of between-school tracked, schooling at the ages 10 through 13 appears to
boost achievement for non-academic-track students – a group comprised of low and, as is visible
from the pre-tracking achievement distributions displayed in Figure 3, also a considerable share of
medium to high achievers. My preferred specification is the DD model in column 4 of Table 2,
which flexibly controls for student characteristics but omits school-level controls that, despite being
chosen carefully to only include inputs that are independent of a state’s tracking policy, might raise
concerns of controlling for mechanisms. Here, 95% confidence sets for the effect of comprehensive
40Formally, I estimate the two conditional expectations E[∆4Yis |Yis2, Comprs = k], for k ∈ {0,1}, non-
parametrically and evaluate their difference at every fourth percentile of Yis2.
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schooling are [0.09, 0.28] in maths, with a point estimate of 0.17 SD, and [0.04, 0.48] in reading,
with a point estimate of 0.24 SD. Whilst the small sample size prohibits a more precise estimation
of the average effect, these results strongly reject tracking proponents’ claim that comprehensive
schooling impedes achievement. As comprehensive systems reduce the homogeneity of classrooms
in terms of ability, these findings are at odds with the notion that there is a monotonously positive
relation between classroom homogeneity and performance.
How large are these estimates? The point estimate of 0.17 SD in maths is roughly half the
female-male achievement gap in maths (0.35), roughly one-third of the migration-native gap (0.50)
and roughly one-fifth of the gap between children of parents from the lowest and the highest
education category (0.94). The point estimate of 0.24 SD in reading is roughly double the male-
female achievement gap in reading (0.11), roughly half the migration-native gap (0.42) and roughly
one-fourth of the parental education gap (0.92).41 Note that the effect sizes are measured in non-
academic-track standard deviations. They are marginally smaller when measured in terms of the
overall student population at 0.15 SD in maths and 0.21 in reading. Still, they are larger than the
zero effect found by Hanushek and Wössmann (2006) at the age of 15. However, most of the
tracked countries in their sample start tracking students at much later ages than considered here,
when effects can generally be expected to be smaller. Importantly, they find that comprehensive
schooling decreases the dispersion of test scores, indicating that weaker students benefit, which can
reconcile these findings. Somewhat similarly, Kerr et al. (2013) find very small average effects of
a Finnish comprehensive schooling reform and larger positive effects for disadvantaged students.
My estimates are similar in magnitude to the one found by Garlick (2018) on South-African college
students’ GPA who are either (ability) tracked or randomly assigned to student dormitories. Also
those are driven by low-achievers. Hence, in the following I will explore the heterogeneity of these
average effects.
4.2 Effect Heterogeneity
As a first step to go beyond average effects, I extend the logic of the DD estimator and, instead of
limiting attention to the mean, inspect how the whole achievement distribution changes differently
41These figures refer to NEPS grade 5 test score gaps for non-academic-track students.
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between Comprehensive and Tracked states from grade 5 to 7.42 Let f Cg (·) be the density of
non-academic-track students’ grade g test scores for the Comprehensive states. The difference
f C7 (y) − f
C
5 (y) measures the change in the density at level Yisg = y between grades 5 and 7 for
this group. f T7 (y) − f
T
5 (y) is the equivalent change for the Tracked states. Comparing these two
quantities across the support of the test score distribution allows me to map out the distributional
consequences of comprehensive schooling:
{ f C7 (y) − f
C
5 (y)} − { f
T
7 (y) − f
T
5 (y)} (3)
Figure 8 presents the results from this exercise. Panels A and B plot density estimates for
grade 5 and grade 7 maths scores respectively for Comprehensive and Tracked states. In the
former the distribution appears to tighten slightly between grades, whereas in the latter it stays
relatively constant. As the differences between the densities are small relative to the scale, panel
C plots the vertical distances between the grade 5 and 7 densities by state group. Thus, these lines
describe how the shape of the test score distributions changes between grades. Finally, panel D
plots the vertical distance between these two lines, corresponding to the expression in equation
(3). It appears that Comprehensive schooling shifts probability mass from the bottom end of the
distribution (approximately from the range [-2.5, -0.5]) to the middle part (approximately to the
range [-0.5, 1.5]). The picture for reading scores is very similar (see Appendix Figure B1). This
means that, next to a positive average effect, comprehensive schooling has an equalising effect on
the achievement distribution.
Figure 4 revealed that a state’s tracking regime strongly affects peer group composition –
but differently for students at different positions in the previous achievement distribution: in
the Tracked states, high-achieving students study together with higher achieving peers and low-
achieving students study together lower achieving peers, whereas in the Comprehensive states a
student’s peer group depends much less on her own performance. If peer quality matters, the effect
of comprehensive schooling is therefore likely to vary with students’ previous achievement. In fact,
it might well be that certain groups of students lose out from being taught comprehensively, but
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Figure 8. Maths score distributions before and after treatment exposure.
Notes: Figure 8 describes how the test score distribution in maths changes differently between fifth and seventh grade depending on the tracking
regime. Panels A and B, respectively for Comprehensive and Tracked states, display kernel density estimates for non-academic-track students’ grade
5 and grade 7 scores at 100 equally spaced points between the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles of the (cross-grade) maths score distribution. Estimation
is based on the NEPS DD sample and a Gaussian kernel with optimal bandwidth for normally distributed variables (Silverman, 1986). Panel C
plots the between-grade differences in the estimated densities at each point, separately for Comprehensive and Tracked states. Panel D plots the
difference between Comprehensive and Tracked states in the between-grade density differences, including pointwise 90% confidence intervals from
a percentile bootstrap with 999 iterations, clustering at the state level and stratifying by tracking regime. The bandwidth of the kernel estimator is
held constant at its optimal level for the original sample in each bootstrap iteration (Hall and Kang, 2001).
that these losses are compensated by the gains of other groups, resulting in a positive net effect.
To explore this possibility I use the NEPS 5-to-7 panel sample of non-academic-track students,
which allows me to match students on previous achievement. Note that in the panel sample the
average effects are marginally smaller: a simple ‘value-added model’ that regresses grade-5-to-7
gain scores on grade 5 scores and an indicator for the Comprehensive states gives effect estimates
of 0.15 SD for maths (p = 0.04) and 0.23 SD for reading (p < 0.01).43 If it is low-achieving
43The DDmodel estimated on the NEPS 5-to-7 panel sample gives virtually identical results to the value-added (VA)
model. Appendix Table B4 presents both the VA model (in column 6) and the DD model (in column 5). The latter is
labelled ‘first-differenced’ (FD) model because with individual-level panel data the DD model can be rewritten in FD
form: ∆7Yis = Yis7 − Yis5 = δ2 + βDD Comprs + ∆uis . Note that the DD/FD model and the VA model are non-nested:
The former controls for grade-constant heterogeneity that correlates with both treatment and outcomes, whereas the
latter controls for selection into treatment based on (previous) outcomes (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). As my goal is to
control for unobserved differences between states, instead of controlling for selection at the individual level the former
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Figure 9. Effect heterogeneity by previous achievement.
Notes: Figure 9 shows the difference in average fifth to seventh grade achievement growth between Comprehensive and Tracked states across the
grade 5 test score distribution in maths (Panel A) and reading (Panel B). Estimation is based on the non-academic-track NEPS 5-to-7 panel sample
(N = 1, 646). The curves are constructed as follows: First, separately for Comprehensive and Tracked states, I estimate a student-level local constant
regression of students’ grade-5-to-7 gain scores on grade 5 test scores. Second, I calculate the difference between Comprehensive and Tracked
states’ fitted values at every fourth percentile of the grade 5 test score distribution. Third, I construct pointwise 95% confidence intervals from
a percentile bootstrap with 999 iterations, clustering at the state level, stratifying by tracking regime and holding the bandwidth constant across
bootstrap iteration (Hall and Kang, 2001).
students who benefit from comprehensive schooling, then the slightly smaller estimates for the
average effect might be explained by the fact that low-achievers are more likely to drop out between
waves and thus are slightly under-represented in the panel sample. To assess effect heterogeneity by
previous achievement explicitly, analogously to above, I estimate the two conditional expectations
E[∆7Yis |Yis5, Comprs = k], for k ∈ {0,1}, non-parametrically and evaluate their difference at
different percentiles of Yis5. This identifies the effects of comprehensive schooling throughout the
pre-tracking achievement distribution.
The results for maths in panel A of Figure 9 reveal that the effect exhibits a steep gradient
with respect to previous achievement: effects appear to be monotonically decreasing in grade 5 test
scores in the first half of the distribution before flattening out, with large and significant effects from
0.5 to 0.2 SD in the bottom quartile, smaller and insignificant effects from 0.2 to 0 SD in the second
quartile and roughly zero effects for all remaining students. In the results for reading in panel B
the gradient by previous achievement is also visible but less pronounced: effects are significant
and positive from the first through the 65th percentile of the grade 5 distribution, monotonically
decreasing from about 0.3 to 0.1 SD, and larger but very imprecisely estimated and insignificantly
show the robustness of the results to this alternative modelling of the selection process and to provide an average effect
benchmark for the VA-style heterogeneity analysis below.
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different from zero thereafter.
These results imply that it is low achievers – and, to the extent that grade 5 achievementmeasures
ability, low-ability students – who drive the positive level effects found before. They seem to benefit
immensely from studying together with their higher achieving peers in a more demanding scholastic
environment for another two years, especially in maths. Importantly, I do not find a negative effect
at any point of the achievement distribution, meaning that higher achievers do not seem to lose
out from learning together with their lower achieving peers. Remember, while non-academic-track
students are a negatively selected group with substantially lower test scores than academic-track
students on average, Figure 3 shows that the distributions of these groups overlap substantially. The
top 25% non-academic-track students would be above-median students even in the academic track.
To investigate effect heterogeneity along other dimensions, in Appendix Table B3 I present
results from fully interacting the DD model with indicators for female, low socio-economic status
(SES) and migration background students. All treatment-covariate interactions are insignificant
and without clear directional pattern across maths and reading scores but, clearly, the analysis
is underpowered to detect smaller effect heterogeneities. Regardless, the striking pattern found
above suggests that previous achievement is the most important dimension for effect heterogeneity
in the current context.44 Several studies found that especially low-SES students benefit from
comprehensive schooling (e.g. Kerr et al., 2013) but in the selected group of non-academic-track
students investigated here SES differences are not very pronounced to begin with. For instance, in
my sample, only 22% of students with college-educated parents even attend a non-academic-track
school. There is a much more salient socio-economic divide between academic- and non-academic
tracks than between different school types in the non-academic segment. Accordingly, the first-
order effect of the treatment of comprehensive schooling in my setting is the mingling of students
of different abilities rather than of different socio-economic backgrounds.
44This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that some sizeable (but insignificant) interaction effects for reading
decrease in magnitude when repeating this exercise in the value-added model that controls for previous achievement
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Figure 10. Effect persistence by previous achievement.
Notes: Figure 10 shows the difference in average fifth to ninth grade achievement growth between Comprehensive and Tracked states across the
grade 5 test score distribution in maths (Panel A) and reading (Panel B). The curves are based on the non-academic-track NEPS 5-to-9 panel sample
comprising all students for whom I observe test scores in both grades (N = 1, 286 for maths and N = 1, 255 for reading). They are constructed
analogously to those in Figure 9.
4.3 Effect Persistence
In this section I present estimation results for ninth-grade outcomes – the grade level after which
students can leave school with a low-track degree (conditional on obtaining the required grades).
Note that interpretation of these results is complicated by the fact that, from seventh grade onwards,
non-academic-track school in the Comprehensive states may sort students by ability but there is no
reliable information on the incidence and exact implementation of this within-school streaming.
More generally, the harmonisation of schooling policies between states decreases with grade level
(Kultusministerkonferenz, 2014). Accordingly, estimates represent a mixture of effect persistence
and effects from continued (but somewhat unclear) differences in tracking and other schooling
inputs. With these caveats in mind, the purpose of this section is two-fold: to obtain a rough idea
of effect persistence and to see whether the patterns found until now replicate in the IQB data.
First, I repeat the above analysis for ninth-grade test scores in the NEPS data. While the
DD estimates in Appendix Table B5 continue to show an advantage for students taught com-
prehensively in grades 5 and 6, they are smaller than before and far from significant as smaller
samples and increased interference from other between-state differences seem to take their toll
on precision.45 As average effects might mask persistence for low-achieving students, Figure 10
45The differences between grade 7 and grade 9 results are not driven by sample differences. Using the smaller grade
9 sample for the grade 7 regressions reproduces the previous results quite precisely.
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Table 3. DD regressions for ninth-grade achievement in the IQB DD sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Reading
Comprehensive schooling 0.136 0.155 0.130 0.175 0.066 0.108 0.026
(p = 0.18) (0.12) (0.30) (0.19) (0.37) (0.35) (0.16)
× Female -0.036
(0.63)




Compr. state indicator -0.018
(0.90)
Classroom peers’ mean score 0.844∗∗∗
(0.00)
R2 0.001 0.021 0.164 0.036 0.069 0.059 0.207
Panel B: Listening
Comprehensive schooling 0.146∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.134 0.088 0.111∗ 0.019
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.15) (0.09) (0.18)
× Female 0.045
(0.53)




Compr. state indicator -0.088
(0.32)
Classroom peers’ mean score 0.887∗∗∗
(0.00)
R2 0.001 0.017 0.199 0.023 0.078 0.098 0.260
(Interacted) controls X
State FE X X X X X X
N state clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
N Compr. state students 13526 13526 13526 13526 13526 11854 13526
N Tracked state students 11276 11276 11276 11276 11276 10186 11276
Notes: Table 7 reports OLS regression results for the DD model for grade 4 and 9 reading (Panel A) and listening (Panel B) test scores of
non-academic-track students using the IQB DD sample. Column 1 report results for the unsaturated DD model. Column 2 reports results for the
saturated DD model, which replaces the Comprehensive state indicator with state fixed effects. Column 3 adds the following student and school
covariates, incl. their interaction with the grade 9 indicator: sex, age, age squared, migration background, foreign language at home, highest
parental level of education (HISCED), highest parental occupational status (HISEI), teacher experience, teacher further training, no. days all-day
schedule/week, private school, homework support and extracurricular learning offers. Columns 4–6 fully interact the saturated DD model without
controls with indicators for female, below-median socio-economic status (SES) and migration background students, respectively. The SES score is
the first principal component of the following variables and their missing dummies: student-reported number of books at home, highest parental
level of education, highest parental occupational status. Column 7 presents results for the saturated DD model controlling for classroom peers’ mean
test scores in the respective subject. p-values in parentheses stem from 999 wild cluster bootstrap iterations, clustering at the state level and using
Webb weights. Estimations apply student sampling weights and results are pooled across the 15 plausible values per test score domain for each
student (see footnote 47 for details). Stars indicate significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
repeats the heterogeneity analysis from above for grade-5-to-9 gain scores using the NEPS 5-to-9
panel sample. Indeed, in maths effects for the lowest quartile of students are both economically
and statistically significant, ranging from 0.15 to 0.3 SD, thus indicating persistent benefits from
deferring between-school tracking for low-achievers. In reading, point estimates are positive but
insignificantly different from zero across the previous achievement distribution.
Second, I re-estimate the DD model using the larger IQB DD sample.46 Note that I can only
46Summary statistics for the IQB DD sample are presented in Appendix Table B6.
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report results for reading and listening, as maths was not tested in ninth grade. Table 4 presents
the estimation results.47 Column 1 presents the unsaturated DD model, which estimates the raw
double difference between Comprehensive and Tracked states between grades 4 and 9. In line
with the NEPS data, I find no significant achievement differences at the end of primary school
but an advantage for non-academic-track students from the Comprehensive states in secondary
school of 0.14 SD in reading and 0.15 SD in listening. This result is robust to including state
fixed effects (column 2) and flexibly controlling for student and school characteristics (column 3),
but only statistically significant for listening. In columns 4–6 I fully interact the DD model with
indicators for female, low-SES and migration background students to test for effect heterogeneities
along observable student characteristics in the larger IQB samples. Of those three, only the SES
interaction seems to substantially reduce the main effect, reaching marginal significance in the
case of reading. Given that low-SES students are more likely to be low achieving, this is at least
qualitatively in line with the heterogeneity by previous achievement found above, which I cannot
directly investigate without panel data. Instead, I repeat the distributional analysis, which confirms
that comprehensive schooling shifts probability mass from the bottom to the middle of the test
score distribution in both reading and listening (see Appendix Figures B2 and B3). In sum, the
IQB results confirm those based on the NEPS data.
47The IQB results pool across 15 so-called ‘plausible values’ (PVs): Students answer different subsets of the total
pool of IQB assessment questions (‘multi-matrix design’). In order to deal with the missing information on questions
outside their subset, each student is imputed 15 PVs per test score domain. Standard practice is to run regressions
for each and combine point estimates and standard errors according to the rules in Rubin (1987). These state that the
variance of a statistic based on m imputations is the sum of the average within-imputation variance and the between-
imputation variance: Var total = m−1
∑
m Varwithinm +(1+m−1)Varbetween. Problematically, the wild cluster bootstrap
does not produce within-variance estimates (i.e. standard errors), but only a distribution of t-statistics from which
p-values are computed. Instead of reverting to standard clustered standard errors (which are likely to underestimate
the within-imputation variance due to the few-cluster problem) to use Rubin’s rule, I decided to ignore the between-
imputation variance and simply pool the wild cluster bootstrapped p-values across imputations (pooling means to
convert them into t-values, average those across imputations and convert back into a p-value). Differences between
PVs are so small that ignoring the between-imputation variance is innocuous in this context. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation supports this choice: Appendix Table B7 shows the effect estimates in the saturated DD model for each
PV/imputation, from which I calculate the between-imputation variance. For each imputation, I then (under-)estimate
the within-imputation variance using a standard cluster-robust variance estimator. The between-variance is only 2.8%
of the underestimated within-variance for reading and 7.4% for listening. So, applying Rubin’s formula, in the case
of listening, one would need to scale the within-variance by 1.08 to get the total variance, which would reduce the
t-statistic by a factor of 1/
√
1.08 = 0.96. For reading this factor is even closer to one. Hence, even in this overly
conservative calculation (due to underestimated within-variances), ignoring the between-variance is close to irrelevant
for the coefficients’ significance. I abstain from further assumptions to pool the bootstrapped confidence sets and only
report averaged coefficients and pooled p-values.
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4.4 Mechanisms
A large part of the preceding analysis has been devoted to understanding whether the estimated
effects are indeed due to between-state differences in tracking. However, even if I can rule out
confounding from school resources and student body composition, it is unclear what are the precise
mechanisms underlying my results. The effect of between-school tracking on student achievement
might operate through various channels.
First, and most problematically for my purposes, the effects might be driven by logistical
implications of running a two- versus a three-tiered school system: in the former states need to
maintain two distinct school types and in the latter three. This may impact local school supply,
i.e. the size of schools and students’ travelling time to school (and thereby time left for homework
and other educational investments). For the sake of generalisability, I would like to rule out these
channels and isolate the portion of the effect that is solely due to the sorting of students by ability
between schools. Therefore, school size has been included in the list of school controls in the
main regressions. The results in Table 2 and Appendix Table B2 suggest that it can be ruled out
as a relevant channel. Due to lack of data I cannot directly control for students’ travelling times.
However, in fifth and seventh grade the NEPS questionnaires asked students to report their weekly
time spent on homework, allowingme to investigate students’ educational time investments directly.
Column 1 of Table 5 presents results for theDDmodel applied to time spent on homework and shows
that non-academic-track students from the Comprehensive state spent less time on homework and
that this difference is constant across grades. As this is the group experiencing higher achievement
gains between grades, time constraints are unlikely to play an important role in this context.
Second, the results might be driven by incentives to exert effort and invest for students and their
parents. In contrast to the Tracked states, in the Comprehensive states students are not ‘locked’ into
(low and intermediate) tracks in the first two years of secondary school. This might give students
the impression that they need to work hard continually to reach their aspired degree; especially since
some non-academic-track schools sort students into low- and intermediate-track classes starting
in grade 7. The same applies to parents, who might thus be incentivised to invest more in their
children’s education during these two years. However, these conjectures do not seem to square
with the evidence presented in Table 5: as mentioned before, column 1 shows that students in the
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Comprehensive states spend less time on homework and, on top of that, columns 2 and 3 show that
they are neither more likely to receive help from their parents with with school work, nor to receive
private tutoring.48
Third, the effects might operate through the taught curriculum: for students who would be
assigned the low track in the three-tiered system, comprehensive schooling is likely to increase
academic standards, whereas for students who would be assigned the intermediate-track standards
might decrease. A priori it is unclear how this might affect achievement, as low-achievers could
lose out from being held to excessive academic standards or benefit if they grow with the demands.
Regardless, given that curricular differences between low- and intermediate-track schools are
relatively small in the first two grades of secondary school (Bald, 2011), this is unlikely to be the
primary driver behind the results. Of course, the ability composition of the class might influence
in what detail the teacher treats the material, but such peer effects should not be confused with
curricular effects.
Fourth, by attending either a low- or a intermediate-track school, students are labelled and
explicitly ranked in the Tracked states, whereas in the Comprehensive states they are not (save for
being below the academic track). This social comparison might negatively affect their academic
self-concept, educational aspirations, motivation to study and, in turn, achievement (Dumont et al.,
2017). Contrary to this, Murphy and Weinhardt (2020) show that classroom rank, which is likely
to be higher in lower tracks, positively affects student achievement. However, their study concerns
the non-tracked English school system where schools are not explicitly ranked. In the German
tracking system, between-school sorting is salient and students are well aware of their track’s rank,
reducing the significance of favourable within-class comparisons in low-track schools. In line with
this conjecture, Dumont et al. (2017) find that school-leaving certificates, which correspond to (but
are not determined by) tracks, are the primary determinant of students’ academic self-concept in
German non-academic-track schools.
To investigate such socio-emotional channels the remaining columns of Table 5 present results
for students’ educational aspirations, their school-related motivation and feelings of helplessness in
school. Only aspirations were measured in grades 5 and 7, allowing for implementation of the DD
48The IQB surveys included questions about private tutoring, too. In Appendix Table B8 I show that this result













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































design. I construct two indicator variables indicating that students aspire higher than the low- or
intermediate-track degree, respectively. The results in columns 4 and 5 show that comprehensive
schooling reduces the share of students with low educational aspirations, while there is no effect
at the higher margin. Increased aspirations at the bottom seem to mirror the large benefits for
low-achieving students found above. The remaining variables were only measured in grade 7, so
that I am forced to revert to OLS regressions with large control sets to approximate the effect of
comprehensive schooling. With this caveat inmind and despite their limited significance, the results
in columns 6–9 suggest that students taught comprehensively are less helpless and more motivated.
Appendix Table B8 shows very similar patterns in the IQB data; in particular, I find strong evidence
for positive effects of comprehensive schooling on motivational outcomes. Although far from
conclusive, these results suggest that socio-emotional effects of tracking are relevant.
The fifth and most palpable mechanism for the effects of any tracking policy is certainly peer
effects – mind you that the stated goal of tracking is to homogenise classroom peers in terms of
ability. According to tracking proponents, this should benefit all students by allowing for more
tailored teaching (Duflo et al., 2011). Tracking opponents argue that, instead of homogeneity, peers’
ability level is what really matters: more able peers generate direct knowledge spill-overs, increase
the quality of classroom interactions (including with teachers) and serve as role models. Numerous
papers show positive effects of mean peer achievement on student achievement (e.g. Sacerdote,
2001; Whitmore, 2005; Ammermüller and Pischke, 2009; Carrell et al., 2009; Lavy et al., 2012;
Burke and Sass, 2013; Garlick, 2018). A growing literature shows non-linearities in the effects of
peers – in particular, very low-achieving peers seem to generate negative spill-overs (e.g. Figlio,
2007; Carrell et al., 2018; Lavy et al., 2012; Bietenbeck, 2020). In a similar vein, Bursztyn and
Jensen (2015) present experimental evidence for the presence of peer pressures penalising effort
in low-track (non-honours) classes that are absent in high-track (honours) classes. The costs of
exposure to low-achieving peer environments might thus well be larger than the benefits of exposure
to high-achieving peer environments.
Figure 4 showed that peer group composition differs significantly between the two tracking
regimes: low-achievers attend lower achieving classrooms on average and, consequently, have
a higher probability of being exposed to the lowest-achieving individuals in the Tracked states.
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Moreover, anecdotes about low-track schools with negative peer dynamics that discourage learning
are common. Peer effects are thus a likely candidate to explain the large gains from comprehensive
schooling for lower achieving students. To test their role directly I perform a simple mediation
analysis. Column 7 of Table 4 presents results from theDDmodel in the IQB data controlling for the
mean of classroom peers’ test scores.49 In both reading and listening the effect of comprehensive
schooling disappears when controlling for mean peer achievement, indicating the importance of
peer effects. The found pattern of effect heterogeneity by previous achievement implies that peer
effects are heterogeneous: low-achievers seem to be more sensitive to peer group composition
than high-achievers – a result also found by Garlick (2018). Altogether, my results confirm the
importance of peer effects in explaining the effects of tracking and, inversely, suggest that the
homogeneity of classrooms at such an early age might be less important than commonly assumed.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper set out to estimate the effect of early between-school tracking in secondary school on
student achievement – an issue that, despite its enduring prevalence in educational policy debates,
is still not fully understood. Theoretically, the question of tracked versus comprehensive schooling
seems to involve a trade-off between countervailing forces. On the one hand, homogeneous learning
environments are likely to facilitate skill and knowledge acquisition as content and teaching style
can be more closely tailored to median classroom ability. On the other hand, the concentration of
high ability students in certain schools might impair competence development of students in lower
tracks through negative motivational consequences and peer effects. Identifying these effects is
notoriously difficult due to the severity of the selection problems involved.
My identification strategy exploits differences in tracking between German federal states: in
all states, about 40% of students transition to the academic track after comprehensive primary
school. Depending on the state, the remaining student body is either divided between low- and
intermediate-track schools or taught comprehensively for another two years. I estimate the effects of
49I am prevented from repeating the mediation analysis in the NEPS data because I do not observe students primary
school (pre-tracking) classrooms. Note that the IQB data is better suited for the analysis of peer effects anyway, first,
because of the large number of observed classes and, second, because participation in the IQB tests is mandatory such
that whole classes are observed. Accordingly, mean peer achievement is measured much more accurately in the IQB
data than in the NEPS.
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these two years of comprehensive instead of tracked schooling on achievement in a triple-differences
framework. The estimator compares achievement growth of comprehensively taught non-academic-
track students with that of tracked ones, while controlling for tracking-regime-specific trends using
unaffected students in the academic track.
I find that student achievement increases when non-academic-track students are not ability
tracked between schools but taught comprehensively for another two years: the 95% confidence
set for the effect on seventh-grade test scores is estimated to be [0.09, 0.28] SD in maths and [0.04,
0.48] SD in reading. These somewhat imprecisely estimated level differences are composed of large
positive effects for low-achievers and null effects for high-achievers. Consequently, comprehensive
schooling has an equalising effect on the distribution of test scores without trading off efficiency
against equity. There is some fade-out in the effects but comprehensively taught students are still
better off towards the end of lower secondary schooling. Auxiliary analyses suggest that students’
school-related motivation and educational aspirations are higher in the comprehensive system and
that peer effects play an important role in explaining the effects.
With respect to Germany, my results confirm the reform efforts of several West German states
to abolish low-track schools and replace their three- with two-tiered school systems. In line with
policy-makers intentions, this appears to generate better and more equitable outcomes. Beyond
the German context, the effects in this paper are immediately relevant for other countries with
multi-track between-school tracking systems, like e.g. Czech Republic, Netherlands and Slovakia.
With respect to countries with two-tiered tracking systems, caution must be exercised when
extrapolating from my results to the effects of turning those into fully comprehensive school
systems. This is because the variation in tracking practices I exploit concerns only the (negatively)
selected group of non-academic-track students. Accordingly, my results might not translate to
students in the academic track. However, note that the central dimension of effect heterogeneity
is previous achievement, which overlaps considerably between tracks. Even for the top quartile of
non-academic-track students, who would be medium-high achievers also in the academic track, I
find no evidence for negative effects from comprehensive schooling (with positive point estimates).
This suggests that, if there are negative effects at the young ages considered here, these are confined
to the very top of students.
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Overall, my results provide a cautionary tale about early and rigid forms of vertical differentia-
tion in schools applicable to all between-school tracking settings. They show that there are limits to
efficiency gains from classroom homogeneity as other mechanisms, such as peer effects, motivation
and aspirations, start to depress achievement at the bottom once a selective system becomes too
differentiated. Accordingly, policy-makers need to carefully balance these forces when determining
the degree of vertical differentiation in their school systems and the age at which it starts.
Finally, note that many papers on within-school streaming report positive effects for students
selected for high-ability classrooms without negative effects for those in regular classrooms (e.g.
Card and Giuliano, 2016; Duflo et al., 2011; Figlio and Page, 2002). Rather than contradicting
my and previous findings on between-school tracking, this suggests that costs of ability grouping
increase with the degree of vertical differentiation between tracks. It makes intuitive sense that
mechanisms relating to peer effects, motivational factors and educational aspirations are more
pronouncedwhen students are separated between schools. Consequently, forming (subject-specific)
classrooms based on ability from a certain age onwards, but eschewing vertical differentiation
between schools to avoid creating detrimental learning environments for low-track students, might
allow reaping efficiency gains from homogeneity without incurring large costs in terms of equity.
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A Data Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to give a detailed description of the data sets and samples used
throughout the paper. This discussion will be guided by Appendix Figure A1, which gives a
schematic overviewof how the different samples correspond to student cohorts and grade levels. The
horizontal axis represents school years, divided into first and second term to show whether students
were surveyed at the beginning or end of a school year. The vertical axis represents grade levels:
the first four grades correspond to primary school, after which students transition to secondary
school. Secondary school finishes after grade 9 in the low track, grade 10 in the intermediate track
and grade 12 or 13, depending on the state, in the academic track. Cells containing survey names
indicate the timing of testing/surveying. The shading shows the progression of sampled cohorts
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Figure A1. Overview of data sets
A.1 National Educational Panel Study
TheGermanNational Educational Panel Study (NEPS) is a study carried out by the Leibniz Institute
for Educational Trajectories at the University of Bamberg. The NEPS collects longitudinal data
on the development of competencies, educational processes, educational decisions, and returns to
education for six different ‘starting cohorts’ (SC): newborns (SC1), kindergarten/primary school
students (SC2), lower secondary school students (SC3), upper secondary school students (SC4),
university students (SC5) and adults (SC6). For details on the project see Blossfeld et al. (2011).
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A.1.1 NEPS-SC3
The main dataset of this paper is the lower secondary NEPS Starting Cohort 3 (NEPS-SC3), a
random sample of newly minted fifth-graders in the school year 2010/11. Students were sampled
according to a multi-stage process: (1) Random sampling (with probabilities proportional to scale)
from the population of all German schools at lower secondary level. (2) Random selection of two
grade 5 classes within the selected schools. (3) All students of the selected classes were invited
to participate in the study. Participating students were surveyed and tested for the first time in the
autumn of 2010, at the beginning of their first year in secondary school. Counting only students
in regular schools, attending fifth grade for the first time in 2010/11, with non-missing test scores
in mathematics and reading, the total size of the ‘NEPS grade 5 cross-section’ is 4,448, of which
2,303 are non-academic-track students, of whom 330 are from the Comprehensive states.
I use information from student and parent questionnaires to construct student-level control
variables: age, a binary indicator for sex, a binary indicator for migration background, a binary
indicator for single parent household, a binary indicator for foreign language spoken at home, an
index for home possessions (from the student questionnaire), highest level of parental education
measured in four categories, monthly household income, a binary indicator for receipt of unem-
ployment benefits (from the parent questionnaire). While the student questionnaire variables are
observed for almost everyone (< 1% missing values), parents’ answers are missing for about 30%
of the sample.
I use information from the school principal questionnaire to construct the following proxies
for school quality/schooling inputs: average teacher age, student-teacher ratio, average class size,
private school and four standardised indices for a school’s facilities50, extracurricular programmes51,
educational support offers52 and quality control measures53. One additional school-level covariate
50The index sums the following binary items about the school’s facilities: presence of gym; swimming pool;
language laboratory; auditorium; common rooms; individual work stations; student library; teacher library.
51The index sums the following binary items about the schools afternoon programme: extracurricular homework
supervision; remedial teaching for students with non-German background; instruction for students with non-German
background; courses in maths; science; German or literature; foreign languages; sports; music or arts; politics or
philosophy; handicrafts; offers in technology or media; community activities; social learning; inter-cultural learning;
required free-time activities; voluntary free-time activities; project days; project weeks; hot lunches; long-term projects.
52The index sums the following binary items about the individual educational support offered by the school: courses
in learning techniques; participation in projects or competitions; homework coaching; tutoring; other forms of coaching.
53The index sums the following binary items about quality control: complete school mission statement; written
school profile; written specification of quality indicators; written specification of performance standards; standardised
performance testing; systematic appraisal of data; school brochure; harmonised exams across classrooms.
53
is retrieved from the teacher questionnaire (but averaged by school to reduce the number of missing
values): days of further training received over the past year. School covariates are missing for about
10% of the sample.
The NEPS being a panel, the same students were tested again two years later, in the autumn
of 2012, when they had just started seventh grade according to schedule. Students that repeated a
grade but remained in the same school are included in the testing, which in Figure A1 is indicated
by two asterisks at grade levels 5 and 6 (note that to still be in fifth grade students would have to
had repeated twice, a case that is not actually observed in the data). Students that switched school
are not part of the grade 7 sample, as testing was tied to students remaining in their initial school
context. All analyses that use grade-5-to-7 gain-scores as outcomes are based on the panel sample
of students who have non-missing test scores in these first two waves of the NEPS-SC3 survey.
This sample is referred to as the ‘NEPS 5-to-7 panel sample’ in the text.
There is substantial attrition in the NEPS-SC3 panel: of the 4,448 students tested in fifth grade
3,521 are tested again in 2012, of whom 1,646 are non-academic-track students, of whom 269
are from the Comprehensive states. This amounts to an overall panel attrition rate of 21%. In
the non-academic tracks the attrition rate is 29%, compared to only 13% in the academic track,
indicating that panel drop-out is negatively associated with achievement. Indeed, limiting attention
to the non-academic-track sample, drop-outs have 0.06 SD lower maths scores (p < 0.01) and 0.04
SD lower reading scores (p < 0.01) than their peers (they are also 4 percentage points more likely to
be migrants (p = 0.06) and 8 percentage points more likely to have low SES (p < 0.01)). Further,
49% of panel drop-outs in the Tracked states are from low-track schools, whereas only 35% of all
non-academic-track students in the Tracked states belong to the low track.
The reasons for drop-out in the non-academic-track sample are schools withdrawing their
participation in the NEPS study (36%), schools or classes being closed (8%) and students switching
school (35%). The remaining 21% drop out for an unknown reason, i.e. either because of absence
on the day of testing or because students or their parents withdrew their participation in the survey.
Overall, attrition is higher in the Tracked states (30% compared to 18% in the Comprehensive
states). However, excluding panel drop-out due to schools withdrawing their participation in the
survey and schools closing (as these are due to administrative reasons at the school level, unlikely
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to be related to schooling policy at the state level and clearly not driven by self-selection at the
student level), there are no significant differences in any of these shares between Comprehensive
and Tracked states.
In addition to students part of the panel sample, the 2012/13 ‘NEPS grade 7 cross-section’ is
augmented with a large random refreshment sample of seventh-graders. The refreshment sample
was drawn to counteract selective attrition: of the 1,795 additional students, a large majority of
1,125 are from non-academic-track schools (of whom 283 are from the Comprehensive states).
Accordingly, the refreshment sample balances the higher rate of attrition in the non-academic
tracks and ensures that the NEPS sample remains representative of the student population in both
segments of the school system. Together with the 3,521 students from the panel sample, the NEPS
grade 7 cross-section has, in total, 5,316 observations, of which 2,771 are in the non-academic
tracks, of which 552 are from the Comprehensive states.
The main difference-in-differences (DD) and triple-differences (DDD) regressions presented
in Table 2 pool the NEPS-SC3 grade 5 and grade 7 cross-sections. The DD model uses non-
academic-track students only and, thus, relies on 2,303 fifth-grade and 2,771 seventh-grade student
observations (for 5074 student×grade observations in total). This is referred to as the (grade 7)
‘NEPS DD sample’ in the text. The DDD model adds academic-track students students as an
additional control group for an additional 2,145 fifth-grade and 2,545 seventh-grade observations
(for 9,764 student×grade observations in total). This is referred to as the (grade 7) ‘NEPS DDD
sample’ in the text. These sample sizes are summarized in Appendix Table A1.
Table A1. Sample sizes of NEPS cross-sections
Non-academic tracks Academic track
Grade 5 Grade 7 Grade 5 Grade 7
Tracked states 1,973 2,219 1,797 2,064
Compr. states 330 552 348 481
DD sample
DDD sample
After the second wave, students were tested again two years later, in the school year 2014/15,
when the cohort attended ninth grade according to schedule. Limiting attention to the non-academic
tracks, of the initial panel sample there are 1,286 observations left in mathematics, of which 186 are
from the Comprehensive states, and 1,255 in reading, of which 191 are from the Comprehensive
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states (testing in reading happened later in the year, explaining the difference in the number of
observations). All analyses that use grade-5-to-9 gain-scores as outcomes are based on these
‘NEPS 5-to-9 panel samples’.
The ‘NEPS grade 9 cross-section’ of non-academic-track students, which on top of the grade-
5-to-9 panel sample includes students from the grade 7 refreshment sample still participating in the
survey, comprises 2,149 student observations, of which 433 are from the Comprehensive states.
Analogously to the seventh-grade DD regressions, for the ninth-grade DD model of Table 3 the
NEPS grade 5 and grade 9 cross-sections are pooled.
A.1.2 NEPS-SC2
The NEPS Starting Cohort 2 (NEPS-SC2), a random sample of German primary school students,
is used as an additional data source for two reasons: (i) to provide information on primary school
inputs and (ii) to investigate achievement trends before tracking starts. The sampling design is very
similar to that of NEPS-SC3, with schools as primary sampling units.54
A concern for the validity of the DD estimates is that school inputs might have changed
differently between primary and secondary school between Tracked and Comprehensive states.
Accordingly, it is important to probe their robustness to the inclusion of school input controls.
However, only the secondary school environment is observed in the NEPS-SC3, which logically
can only affect the post-treatment (grade 7) scores. For the pre-treatment (grade 5) scores, the
relevant schooling inputs are those from primary school, which are missing because because I do
not observe the primary school students came from. To impute the missing primary school/pre-
treatment schooling inputs in the NEPS-SC3 DD sample, I use the SC2 principal questionnaires. In
particular, I calculate state-level averages for all the above-mentioned school-level controls, using
the earliest available principle questionnaire for each school to minimise the distance between my
main cohorts primary school time and the time the primary school information is recorded (in vast
majority of cases this means 2012), and assign each grade 5 observation in the NEPS DD sample
its state-level average.55
54Note that the NEPS-SC2 panel commenced two years prior to primary school, when children were still in
kindergarten. Still, primary schools served as primary sampling units. As the earlier waves of the panel are irrelevant
for the purpose of this paper, they are ignored in this description.
55Fortunately, primary school (SC2) principals were asked the same questions as those in secondary school (SC3).
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For the analyses of primary school achievement trends, I use the NEPS-SC2’s student-level
achievement data. As shown in Appendix Figure A1, the first measurement point used here is the
beginning of the school year 2013/14, when the surveyed cohort has just entered second grade.
Counting only students in regular schools with with non-missing test scores in mathematics, the
total size of the ‘NEPS grade 2 cross-section’ is 5,384, of which 979 are from the Comprehensive
states.
Students were tested again two years later, in the autumn of 2015, when they had just started
fourth grade according to schedule. Those that repeated a grade but remained in the same school
were included in the testing. Students that switched school are not part of the grade 4 sample.
Analyses that use grade-2-to-4 gain-scores as outcomes are based on the panel sample of students
who have non-missing test scores in these first two waves of the NEPS-SC2. This sample is referred
to as the ‘NEPS 2-to-4 panel sample’ in the text. It comprises 4,676 observations in total, of which
849 are from the Comprehensive states. Hence, the attrition rate between second and fourth grade
is 13% overall and in both state groups. Again, panel drop-out is negatively related to performance:
drop-outs have 0.18 SD lower maths scores (p < 0.01).
In addition to the panel sample the ‘NEPS grade 4 cross-section’ includes 1,141 newly sampled
students56 for a total sample size of 5,817, of which 1,059 are from the Comprehensive states. The
DDmodel presented in Appendix Table B3 pools the NEPS-SC2 grade 2 and grade 4 cross-sections
for a total sample size of 11,201 student×grade observations.
A.2 IQB National Assessment Studies
For auxiliary analysis the paper draws on two large German cross-sectional educational assessment
studies carried out by the Institute for Educational Quality Improvement (IQB) at the behest of
the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the States (KMK):
the IQB National Assessment Study 2011 (IQB Ländervergleich in der Primarstufe 2011; IQB11)
and the IQB National Assessment Study 2015 (IQB-Bildungstrend 2015 in der Sekundarstufe I;
IQB15). The purpose of the IQB studies is to monitor in how far students meet nationally defined
56Unlike in the NEPS-SC3, the newly sampled students are not part of a refreshment sample. These are students
that were part of the SC2 kindergarten sample but then attended a primary school that did not participate in the NEPS.
For financial reasons, after kindergarten these students were only tested again in fourth grade.
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educational standards for the primary and lower secondary level. Participation in the IQB tests is
mandatory for all sampled students.57 In contrast to the NEPS’ sampling design, the IQB studies
do not randomly sample from the population of all German students in a particular grade level but,
instead, draw separate random samples within each state. Accordingly, smaller states are heavily
overrepresented in the IQB data and the use of student sampling weights is necessary to obtain
estimates representative of Germany.
A.2.1 IQB11
The IQB11 was the first primary-level National Assessment Study (see Stanat et al., 2012, for
details). It tested fourth-graders in mathematics, reading and listening at the end of the 2010/11
school year, when students were at the end of their primary school time. As can be seen in Appendix
Figure A1, this is one cohort later than the NEPS-SC3 cohort. Within each state, sampling followed
a multi-stage process: (1) Random sampling of primary schools. (2) Random selection of one
fourth-grade class within selected schools. (3) All students in the selected class were obliged to
participate.
Again retaining only students with non-missing test scores on regular schools, the total sample
size of the ‘IQB11 grade 4 cross-section’ is 18,904, of which 11,187 are from the Comprehensive
states. Note that the number of sampled schools in each state was chosen depending on earlier
estimates of the variance in student performance to achieve similar level of precision in each state.
Accordingly, the number of observations is different per state and not proportional to the actual
share of a state’s schools (or students) of the overall German population.
Most of the analysis restricts attention to non-academic-track students. Hence, classifying
students as academic- or non-academic-track is crucial. This presents a challenge for using the
IQB11 data as there is is no official assignment of students to tracks in primary school yet.
Fortunately, however, the IQB11 survey was conducted at the very end of the school year: data
collection ran from the end of May until mid July. Fourth-grade students receive their track
recommendation with their mid-term reports in January and then start applying for secondary
schools. The application period typically ends in March. Accordingly, at the time of the survey it
57However, participation in the accompanying student, parent and teacher questionnaires is not mandatory in some
states, such that, control variables have more missing values.
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had been decided which secondary school, and hence track, students would attend in the coming
year already. The IQB11 survey asked parents directly which school their child will attend in
the coming year. As, unfortunately, this variable has about 20% missing values due to parental
non-response I also use information on students’ track recommendation, which is reported by the
school and has almost no missing values (1%), to classify students as academic or non-academic
(see below). The resulting IQB11 grade 4 cross-section of non-academic-track students comprises
11,158 observations, of which 6,573 are from the Comprehensive states.
In order to classify students as accurately as possible based on the two above-mentioned
variables, I choose state-specific assignment rules that maximise the fit between the state-specific
academic-track shares estimated from my sample and the true shares, obtained from administrative
records (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012). In seven states where the track recommendation is
non-binding,58 I assign all students whose parents report that their child will attend an academic-
track school in the coming year to the academic track. Among those students with a missing
parent answer, I classify students with an academic track recommendation as academic. The rest
is classified as non-academic. In the remaining five states where the track recommendation is
binding, two (slightly) different assignment rules emerge as best predictors: In Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg, I only assign students to the academic track if they have both an academic-track
recommendation and their parents report that they will attend an academic-track school in the
coming year. All others are classified as non-academic. In Thuringia, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt,
I assign all students whose parents report that they will attend an academic-track school in the
coming year to the academic track, unless they fail to have an academic-track recommendation
(however, a missing value on this variable is fine). Of those with a missing parent answer, those
with an academic-track recommendation are assigned to the academic track. The rest is classified
as non-academic.
A.2.2 IQB15
The IQB15 tested ninth-graders in reading and listening at the end of the 2014/15 school year,
towards the end of lower secondary schooling (see Stanat et al., 2016, for details).59 As can be seen
58These are Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein.
59Unfortunately, the IQB15 did not test students in maths.
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in Appendix Figure A1, this is the same cohort as the NEPS-SC3 cohort used for the main analysis.
Sampling and survey design is largely identical to the IQB11 survey. Within each state, sampling
followed a multi-stage process: (1) Random sampling of secondary schools. (2) Random selection
of one ninth-grade class within selected schools. (3) All students in the selected class were obliged
to participate.
All analysis based on the IQB15 data restrict attention to students on regular non-academic-
track schools with non-missing test scores. The total sample size of the non-academic-track ‘IQB15
grade 9 cross-section’ is 13,742 students, of whom 7,009 are from the Comprehensive states.
The DD regressions for reading and listening competencies presented in Table 4, as well as the
DD regressions for non-cognitive outcomes presented in Table B8, pool the non-academic-track
IQB11 grade 4 and IQB15 grade 9 cross-sections for the ‘IQBDD sample’ of 24,900 student×grade
observations.
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Reading score
Compr. - Tracked
Pointwise 90 percent CI
Figure B1. Reading score distributions before and after treatment exposure.
Notes: Figure B1 describes how the test score distribution in reading changes differently between grades 5 and 7 depending on the tracking regime.
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Reading score
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Figure B2. Distributional analysis for reading scores in the IQB data.
Notes: Figure B2 repeats the distributional analysis from Figure 8 using fourth and ninth grade reading scores in the IQB DD sample (N = 20, 139).
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Listening score
Compr. - Tracked
Pointwise 90 percent CI
Figure B3. Distributional analysis for listening scores in the IQB data.
Notes: Figure B3 repeats the distributional analysis from Figure 8 using fourth and ninth grade listening scores in the IQBDD sample (N = 20, 139).
The density estimates are based on the first plausible value and apply student sampling weights. Otherwise the curves are constructed analogously
to Figure 8.
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Table B1. Summary statistics and balance test for school characteristics.
Primary school Secondary school Double
Compr. Tracked p-value Compr. Tracked p-value difference
states states (1)=(2) states states (4)=(5) β̂stdDD p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: NEPS data
Teacher age (years) 47.52 46.64 (0.38) 48.82 47.36 (0.33) 0.14 (0.61)
Further training past year (index) -0.03 0.02 (0.87) 0.31 0.12 (0.57) 0.14 (0.39)
School size (students) 36.79 47.08 (0.20) 63.92 75.48 (0.52) -0.04 (0.72)
Student-teacher ratio 14.02 14.66 (0.52) 11.03 12.56 (0.18) -0.31 (0.46)
School equipment (index) -0.14 0.07 (0.47) 0.25 0.12 (0.50) 0.31 (0.31)
Educational support (index) 0.14 -0.05 (0.39) 0.92 0.21 (0.02) 0.53 (0.11)
Extracurriculars (index) 0.25 -0.05 (0.29) -0.10 -0.30 (0.66) -0.10 (0.89)
Quality control (index) 0.02 0.01 (0.97) 0.05 0.10 (0.91) -0.06 (0.45)
N schools 62 261 29 133 485
Panel B: IQB data
Teacher job experience (years) 23.56 18.27 (0.10) 20.81 13.92 (0.11) 0.14 (0.34)
Further training past two years (hours) 25.60 27.12 (0.58) 25.16 29.50 (0.42) -0.08 (0.57)
Private school (binary) 0.06 0.02 (0.14) 0.07 0.08 (0.88) -0.21 (0.20)
Class size 18.89 20.23 (0.06) 23.26 24.10 (0.52) 0.11 (0.66)
All-day schedule/week (days) 2.15 1.94 (0.85) 2.86 2.73 (0.80) -0.04 (0.95)
Homework support (binary) 0.78 0.72 (0.43) 0.75 0.69 (0.41) -0.00 (0.99)
Extracurricular learning (binary) 0.32 0.24 (0.13) 0.24 0.28 (0.49) -0.26 (0.09)
N schools 578 377 340 298 1593
Notes: Table B1 reports means of school covariates by state group for primary schools (columns 1–2) and non-academic-track secondary schools
(columns 4–5). Panel A refers to the NEPS data, where the primary school information comes from the NEPS-SC2 data set and the secondary
school information comes from the (main) NEPS-SC3 data set (see Appendix A for details). Panel B refers to the IQB data, where the primary
school information comes from the fourth-grade IQB11 data set and the secondary school information from the ninth-grade IQB15 data set. All
indices are normalised to mean zero and standard deviation one, separately by grade level. Columns 3 and 6 report p-values for tests for zero
mean differences in each covariate between the Tracked and Comprehensive states’ primary and secondary schools, respectively. Column 7 reports
normalised double-differences for each variable, which equal the second difference between Comprehensive and Tracked states between primary
and secondary school, divided by the variable’s standard deviation. Column 8 reports p-values testing for a zero double-difference between state
groups and grades. All tests are based school-level regressions and 999 wild cluster bootstraps iterations with Webb weights, clustering at the state



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B3. DD regression for primary school maths score.
Dependent variable: Mathematics
(1)










N state clusters 12
N Compr. state students 2038
N Tracked state students 9163
Notes: Appendix table B3 reports regression results for the unsat-
urated DD model applied to primary school maths achievement,
i.e. from regressing grade 2 and grade 4 test scores on an intercept,
an indicator for the Comprehensive states, an indicator for grade
4 observations and their interaction. This tests whether already in
primary school (i.e. before students are exposed to different track-
ing regimes) mean achievement diverges between Comprehensive
and Tracked states. p-values in parantheses and 95%-confidence
sets in brackets stem from 999 wild cluster bootstrap iterations,
clustering at the state level and using Webb weights. Stars indicate


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B5. Effect persistence until ninth-grade.
Dependent variable: Level test scores Grade-5-to-9 gain scores
Model specification: DD DD VA VA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Mathematics
Comprehensive schooling 0.054 0.084 0.088 -0.049
(p = 0.53) (0.39) (0.26) (0.81)
[-0.10, 0.33] [-0.27, 0.43] [-0.08, 0.25] [-0.39, 0.25]
× Below median gr. 5 score 0.257
(0.38)
[-0.22, 0.78]
N Compr. state students 753 753 186 186
N Tracked state students 3619 3619 1100 1100
Panel B: Reading
Comprehensive schooling 0.198 0.290 0.163 0.133
(0.20) (0.30) (0.35) (0.37)
[-0.23, 0.44] [-0.30, 0.52] [-0.14, 0.38] [-0.29, 0.32]
× Below median gr. 5 score 0.061
(0.69)
[-0.25, 0.50]
N Compr. state students 754 754 191 191
N Tracked state students 3522 3522 1064 1064
Controls X
State FE X X
Grade 5 score X X
Notes: Columns 1–2 present OLS regression results for the saturated DD model for grade 5 and 9 test scores in maths (Panel A) and reading (Panel
B), estimated on the grade 9 NEPS DD sample of non-academic-track students. Column 1 presents the model without controls and column 2 adds
student covariates, interacted with grade level, and school covariates (see notes of Table 2). Column 3 presents results for the value-added (VA)
model, i.e. from regressing grade-5-to-9 gain scores on an indicator for the Comprehensive states and the grade 5 score. The regressions use the
panel sample of non-academic-track students for whom both grade 5 and grade 9 test scores are observed. Column 4 interacts the Comprehensive
state indicator with an indicator for students with below-median grade 5 test scores (and adds this indicator as a separate regressor). p-values in
parentheses and 95%-confidence sets in brackets stem from 999 wild cluster bootstrap iterations, clustering at the state level and usingWebb weights.
Stars indicate significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B6. Summary statistics for the IQB DD sample.
Non-academic primary Non-academic secondary
school students (IQB11) school students (IQB15)
Compr. Tracked p-value Compr. Tracked p-value
states states (1)=(2) states states (4)=(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pre-treatment outcomes
Grade 4 mathematics score -0.09 -0.00 (0.62)
Grade 4 reading score -0.02 -0.00 (0.87)
Grade 4 listening score -0.08 0.00 (0.32)
Self-concept German 0.00 -0.00 (0.94)
Social integration -0.13 -0.00 (0.11)
Reading motivation -0.09 -0.00 (0.05)
Attitude towards reading -0.02 0.00 (0.74)
Private tutoring 0.23 0.24 (0.81)
Panel B: Student characteristics
Female (binary) 0.48 0.46 (0.10) 0.46 0.47 (0.82)
Age 10.63 10.52 (0.09) 15.62 15.66 (0.19)
Migration background (binary) 0.15 0.31 (0.06) 0.18 0.36 (0.06)
Foreign language at home (binary) 0.12 0.21 (0.07) 0.15 0.28 (0.10)
Parental education:
Low 0.45 0.43 (0.25) 0.50 0.49 (0.60)
Mid 0.41 0.41 (0.88) 0.34 0.34 (0.93)
High 0.14 0.16 (0.13) 0.16 0.17 (0.47)
Parental HISEI score 43.28 44.29 (0.18) 44.82 44.68 (0.91)
N students 6573 4585 7009 6733
Notes: Table B6 reports means of pre-treatment outcomes and student covariates by state group for primary school students classified
as non-academic (columns 1–2) and non-academic-track secondary school students (columns 4–5). The former are based on the
grade 4 IQB11 data and the latter on the IQB15 grade 9 data. All figures use student weights. Columns 3 and 6 report p-values for
tests for zero mean differences between Tracked and Comprehensive states. Test are based on 999 wild cluster bootstraps iterations,
clustering at the school level, using Webb weights.
Table B7. IQB DD results by plausible value.
Dependent variable: Reading Listening
Plausible value β̂DD p-value β̂DD p-value
PV1 0.160 (0.12) 0.154 (0.04)
PV2 0.142 (0.21) 0.141 (0.06)
PV3 0.129 (0.25) 0.132 (0.08)
PV4 0.150 (0.14) 0.175 (0.02)
PV5 0.163 (0.18) 0.15 (0.05)
PV6 0.122 (0.24) 0.123 (0.10)
PV7 0.131 (0.18) 0.148 (0.08)
PV8 0.154 (0.12) 0.17 (0.02)
PV9 0.156 (0.14) 0.164 (0.02)
PV10 0.139 (0.13) 0.121 (0.08)
PV11 0.162 (0.10) 0.139 (0.04)
PV12 0.153 (0.11) 0.175 (0.02)
PV13 0.164 (0.11) 0.152 (0.06)
PV14 0.166 (0.10) 0.142 (0.04)
PV15 0.173 (0.07) 0.165 (0.03)
Average 0.151 (.15) 0.150 (.05)
Notes: Table B7 displays coefficient estimates with accordant wild cluster bootstrapped
p-values for the saturated DD model without controls for reading and listening scores in
the IQB sample separately by plausible value. For details about the model see Table 4.
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Table B8. DD regressions for behavioural and socio-emotional outcomes in the IQB data.
Dependent Self-concept Reading Attitude towards Social Private
variable: languages motivation reading integration tutoring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Comprehensive schooling -0.012 0.133∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.068 -0.047
(0.90) (0.02) (0.02) (0.42) (0.21)
[-0.20, 0.18] [0.04, 0.24] [0.04, 0.26] [-0.10, 0.24] [-0.13, 0.02]
Controls X X X X X
State FE X X X X X
R2 0.057 0.077 0.089 0.030 0.030
N state clusters 12 12 12 12 12
N Compr. state students 9465 6743 6907 9594 7872
N Tracked state students 7532 5752 5906 7671 6705
Notes: This table reports results for the fully controlled, saturated DD model applied to different non-cognitive outcomes in the IQB DD sample of
non-academic-track students, each time retaining all observations with non-missing values for the respective dependent variable. ‘Private tutoring’
is an indicator variable equal to one if the student reports receiving private tutoring. All remaining variables are composite scores designed by the
IQB, intended to measure the indicated psychological construct, each based on several survey items measured on 4-point Likert scales. I standardise
all of them to mean zero and standard deviation one in the group of Tracked states’ non-academic-track students, separately by grade. p-values in
parentheses and 95%-confidence sets in brackets stem from 999 wild cluster bootstrap iterations using Webb weights, clustering at the state level.
Stars indicate significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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